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Budgetary pressures make it difficult for Naval aviation leaders to balance operations, 
procurement, and personnel to maintain appropriate levels of readiness to meet the 
demands of combatant commanders. The Naval Aviation Enterprise has had success in 
reducing the cost of Naval aviation, but operational squadrons are not systematically 
included in those efforts. This thesis explores how Naval aviation stakeholders define 
success for Navy strike fighter squadrons and develops a balanced scorecard that can 
align squadron success factors with the Commander, Naval Air Force’s  mission of 
“…delivering the right force with the right readiness at the right time with a reduced 
cost....”  Providing objectives, performance measures, and targets in a balanced scorecard 
framework will enable squadrons to reduce operating costs without sacrificing 
effectiveness or readiness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While we hone our individual, unit and family readiness, we have to deal 
with diminishing resources. We must adopt and embrace a culture of fiscal 
responsibility and judiciousness. We must be ready and willing to make 
analytically sound, hard choices in the months and years ahead. Further, 
we must also look at innovative ways of maintaining our forward 
deployed and ready posture, while seeking efficiencies and reducing costs 
when we can.  (Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations) 
With the conclusion of operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the impending end of 
operation ENDURING FREEDOM, America is entering the post-conflict cycle of budget 
cuts and force reductions.   This time, however, the U.S. Navy finds itself in a situation 
different from wars past. Despite being a leaner force with fewer ships and personnel 
than it had on September eleventh, the demand for Naval presence and Naval aviation is 
not expected to subside in step with its budget authority. With limited transfer authority 
and the indiscriminate cuts of the Budget Control Act, the operations and maintenance 
accounts are being crowded out and constricted. Navy leadership must find a way to 
reduce operating costs while preserving readiness and capability. That effort will be no 
small task and success will literally require an all-hands effort.   
Strike fighter squadrons have focused primarily on effectiveness since 2001; now 
leaders must ask them to consider efficiency and cost reduction. Reducing operating costs 
while avoiding negative effects on readiness and safety will require careful balance. The 
organizational change required to introduce cost into the conversations of how to best 
manage a squadron can be accomplished with the clear translation of leadership’s vision 
into squadron personnel action. Goals at all levels will need to be set, progress will need 
to be measured, and feedback will be required to adjust the plan. All of these elements 
must be coordinated and aligned to ensure success. This thesis proposes using the 
balanced scorecard to bring Commander, Naval Air Force’s mission of the “right 
readiness at a reduced cost” to the deckplates of strike fighter squadrons without 
sacrificing effectiveness. 
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The following sections provide context to the operating environment of strike 
fighter squadrons. The background begins with the strategic guidance of Navy leadership 
followed by a description of the flying hour program and execution guidance for strike 
fighter squadrons. The next sections discuss the role of the Naval Aviation Enterprise and 
the various cost analysis tools and cost saving initiatives. The last sections describe two 
prominent performance measure systems that drive squadron behavior and are necessary 
for framing the research and adapting the balanced scorecard. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Naval Aviation Strategic Guidance 
Recent guidance issued by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the 
Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) illustrates the challenges that lie ahead for Naval 
aviation. Their descriptions of fiscal pressure and its effects on managing the force mark 
a change to the environment that has prevailed since 2001. Meeting commitments in this 
new environment will not be easy. In his Navigation Plan, the CNO (2013) acknowledges 
the increasing fiscal constraints:  
We are evaluating adjustments to our FY2014 budget due to the potential 
for a continuing resolution and the onset of sequestration. This will 
challenge our ability to sustain some of the warfighting investments, 
forward presence and readiness described below. Regardless of reductions, 
we will continue to operate forward with ready forces, where it matters, 
when it matters. I will update this Navigation Plan if our course changes 
substantially and will issue a position report based on a “fix” later this 
year. 
Despite impending fiscal constraints, the CNO (2012) holds that the following 
three tenets be applied to every decision: 
• Warfighting first—Be ready to fight and win today, while building the 
ability to win tomorrow. 
• Operate forward—Provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in 
an era of uncertainty 
• Be ready—Harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse 
force to be ready to fight and responsibly employ our resources. 
The three tenets are further reinforced by his first two guiding principles: 
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• Our primary mission is warfighting. All our efforts to improve 
capabilities, develop people, and structure our organizations should be 
grounded in this fundamental responsibility. 
• People are the Navy’s foundation. We have a professional and moral 
obligation to uphold a covenant with Sailors, civilians and their families—
to ably lead, equip, train and motivate. 
The Commander of Naval Air Forces is responsible for the funding, manning, 
resourcing, and training of Naval aviation forces to support combatant commanders’ 
operational requirements. CNAF’s mission statement is:  
Naval Air Forces’ mission is to man, train, equip and maintain a Naval air 
force that is immediately employable, forward deployed and engaged. We 
support the fleet and unified commanders by delivering the right force 
with the right readiness at the right time with a reduced cost…today and in 
the future. 
In February, 2013 CNAF issued the Naval Aviation Enterprise Strategic Guidance, 2013–
2014. In it, he acknowledges the effects of an increasingly austere fiscal environment on 
Naval aviation. 
Operational demand for Naval aviation forces for the foreseeable future 
will hold steady or increase because of the value these forces bring to the 
fight. Juxtaposed with that fact, Naval aviation is operating in a resource 
constrained environment where we must balance the needs of the Navy 
and Marine Corps with the realities of a budget reflecting the country’s 
deficit and rising debt. Naval aviation faces an estimated $3.5B operations 
and support (O&S) shortfall between FY13 and FY19. It will take a 15% 
reduction in total O&S costs to close this gap. An effort of this magnitude 
must include a dynamic O&S cost reduction strategy, a renewed emphasis 
on “cost-wise readiness” and a demanding “should cost” perspective 
across the NAE. This gap closure strategy must address not only flying 
hour cost but all element of O&S cost. 
CNAF’s gap closure strategy included the following action: 
Reduce the overall flying hour program cost per flight hour across all type 
model series by ten percent. Aggregate execution index of 1.1 across all 
TMS [type/model/series] is the goal.    Specific TMS CPFH [cost per 
flight hour] goals will be established according to the TMS life cycle 
position, with newer TMS platforms having the most potential to realize 
CPFH savings. 
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Meeting all operational requirements within the current fiscal environment 
presents a challenge to all Navy units. The tone of urgency within the most recent 
statements and the clear need for creative solutions provided inspiration for this thesis. 
To fully appreciate how far one must go to realize CNAF’s vision, it is important 
to understand the current cost elements of the Navy’s flying hour program budget. It is 
also important to identify current guidance given to strike fighter squadrons as they 
execute their portions of the budget. 
2. Navy Flying Hour Program 
The following sections provide a simplified overview of how the navy flying hour 
program (FHP) relates to the costs of strike fighter squadrons. 
The FHP is a budgetary instrument which translates force requirements into 
readiness requirements, then into flight hour requirements, and finally into budgetary 
resources for Naval aviation. The FHP receives funding from the operations and 
maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation account and supports three mission areas: 
tactical air, fleet air training, and fleet air support (Jarvis, 2006).   
Formulating a budget to support the FHP requires the input of required flight 
hours for each mission area. The Navy uses the flying hours requirements model depicted 
in Figure one to determine the total cost of the FHP (CBO, 2012). 
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Figure 1.  Flight Hour Requirements Model (from CBO, 2012) 
The number of flight hours for tactical aviation is ultimately driven by the global 
force management allocation plan (Bouyer, 2013). This Department of Defense process, 
managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, takes the validated presence requirements of the 
combatant commanders in the unified command plan and creates a schedule for all 
military forces worldwide (Joint Forces Staff College, 2012). U.S. Fleet Forces command 
and U.S. Pacific Fleet implement the fleet response plan to manage Naval assets to meet 
the global force management (GFM) demands (OPNAV, 2006). The fleet response plan 
drives the deployment cycles of aircraft carriers and the readiness levels of Naval forces 
within the plan (OPNAV, 2006). The Commander of Naval Air Forces then develops the 
master aviation plan which translates the global force management plan into a schedule 
specific to carrier air wings and forward deployed Naval air forces (Bouyer, 2013). 
CNAF coordinates with U.S. Fleet Forces Command to manage the readiness levels of 
aviation forces required to meet the needs of combatant commanders. The fleet readiness 
training plan (FRTP) provides a 27 month schedule of readiness standards, funding 




combatant commanders (CNAF, 2012b). The proximity of a particular unit to its 
deployment date will dictate where it lies within the FRTP. Figure 2 illustrates the GFM 
to FRTP process.  
 
Figure 2.  Translating Force Requirements to Flight Hours (from CNAF N40B1, 2012) 
Each month in the FRTP, known as an R+Month, has an associated readiness 
expectation (left margin in the bottom pane of Figure 2), and an expected percentage of 
funding (right margin in the bottom pane of Figure 2). Each R+Month has a standard 
number of flight hours associated with its readiness expectation. The FRTP is the element 
of the FHP that translates strike fighter squadrons’ readiness requirements into flight hour 
requirements (CNAF N40B1, 2012). The FRTP translation of readiness to flight hours 
puts the focus on flight hour execution. Meeting combatant commanders’ needs means 
having the right level of readiness to successfully carry out the unit’s mission (CJCS, 
2010). Readiness is driven by flight hours under the assumption that the more one flies, 
the more capable (ready) one becomes. Readiness is purchased through flight hour 
execution (Bouyer, 2013). 
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With the number of flight hours known based upon all the units’ positions within 
the MAP, the FHP uses the cost components in the flying hour requirements model to 
calculate a cost per flight hour (CBO, 2012). The cost components are aviation depot 
level repairables, aviation fleet maintenance (also known as maintenance consumables), 
fuel, and maintenance contracts (CBO, 2012). The calculations can be seen in Figure 3. 
Another cost component to the FHP is “funding other” which includes indirect expenses 
in support of training and operations (Glenn & Otten, 2005). “Funding other” is not 
specifically programmed within the FHP and is allocated to cost per hour across the other 
components in the aviation cost evaluation system and aviation financial analysis system 
(Glenn & Otten, 2005). 
 
Figure 3.  Components of Cost per Flying Hour (from CBO, 2012) 
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The final step of translating the force requirements to budgetary resources 
involves multiplying the required flight hours with the calculated cost per flight hour 
(Figure 3). This process yields the OP-20 budget exhibit which serves as primary 
programming and execution guidance for the FHP (Glenn & Otten, 2005). 
The OP-20 budget exhibit sets the funding levels for the four budget submitting 
offices associated with the FHP: Commander Pacific Fleet, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 
Commander, Naval Forces Europe, and Commander Naval Reserve Forces (Glenn & 
Otten, 2005). OMN funds are allocated to the budget submitting offices who further 
allocate funding to their subordinate type commands (e.g., Commander, Naval Air Forces 
Pacific and Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic) (Jarvis, 2006). Commanders, Naval 
Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic use the OP-20 to determine the operational targets and 
grants allocated to each squadron within a type wing or carrier air wing (Glenn & Otten, 
2005).   
Operational targets are divided into two operational functional categories: aircraft 
flight operations (OFC-1) and aircraft operations maintenance (OFC-50). Squadrons 
receive grants each quarter establishing specific funding levels for fuel (funding code 7B 
in OFC-1), administrative and flight equipment (funding code 7F in OFC-1), and flight 
hours (Jarvis, 2006). Squadrons are responsible for managing the precise expenditure of 
their operational targets in OFC-1 (CNAL, 1999). Squadrons are required to submit a 
budget operational target report to their type commander each month (CNAL, 1999). This 
report details the squadron’s executed flight hours and expenditures for 7F and 7B coded 
funds. Squadron charges in OFC-50 for aviation depot level repairables and aviation fleet 
maintenance are entered into the Naval aviation logistics command management 
information system (NALCOMIS) by squadrons and fleet readiness centers (intermediate 
and depot maintenance facilities)(CNAF, 2013b). Squadrons are not given specific 
operational targets for aviation fleet maintenance or aviation depot level repairables costs, 
nor do they directly track or manage OFC-50 expenditures (CNAL, 1999).  
While strike fighter squadrons must precisely track and manage their operational 
targets, they are only held accountable for the execution of flight hours (Bouyer, 2013). 
Figure 4 is a slide from a PowerPoint presentation given by the Commander, Naval Air 
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Forces Pacific flight hour program manager. This presentation is given to prospective 
commanding officers, executive officers, and operations officers. It provides an overview 
of the FHP and guidance for properly managing operational targets. 
 
Figure 4.  FHP Management Guidance to Squadrons (from Bouyer, 2013) 
The presentation informs squadrons that they are scrutinized on their execution of 
hours not their costs. The slide in Figure 4 also asserts that fuel is a “small slice” of the 
overall FHP. The following slide in the presentation shows the cost structure for a typical 
air wing (Figure 5).   
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Figure 5.  Air Wing Cost Structure (from Bouyer, 2013) 
Figure 5 shows the cost components to the FHP and their relative share in the 
overall costs of a carrier air wing. An important aspect of this figure is that it groups all 
of the various types of aircraft in an air wing together. Table 1 shows the average cost 
structure for FA-18E/F operational strike fighter squadrons over a three-year period. 
 
Table 1.   Average Cost Structure and Cost Per Hour of Operational FA-18E/F 
Squadrons (from CNAF, 2013d) 
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Taking the data from Table 1 and putting it into the same graphic as in Figure 5, 
one can see a difference. Figure 6 shows the cost structure of all operational FA-18E/F 
strike fighter squadrons. 
 
Figure 6.  Average Operational FA-18E/F Cost Structure FY11-FY13 
Viewing the same graphic from the perspective of the FA-18E/F 
type/model/series, it is probably more difficult to defend an argument that $450 million is 
a small part of the FA-18E/F cost. The fiscal year 2011 expenditures for all Navy 
type/model/series aircraft were $3.242 billion (CNAF, 2013d). Fuel expenditures for all 
type/model/series in the same year were $1.427 billion; 44 percent of total expenditures. 
Fuel expenditures for the FA-18E/F were 30 percent of total Naval aviation fuel 
expenditures.  
Cost saving has been a major focus of Naval aviation leadership for many years. 
Movements to approach managing Naval aviation like a business took form in the early 
nineties (CNAF, 2013a). The Naval Aviation Enterprise eventually took shape and has 
become an element for cost saving initiatives within Naval aviation. 
3. The Naval Aviation Enterprise 
The Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) is a partnership of Naval aviation 
stakeholders spanning Navy and Marine Corps platform communities and functional 
areas to provide a “single framework for facilitating collaborations, transparency, 
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information sharing, and process improvement across the Naval aviation stakeholder 
communities” (NAE Strategic Plan, 2012). As an organization within an organization, the 
NAE provides a means for analysis, focus of effort, continuous process improvement 
implementation, culture shaping, and strategic alignment to aid the decision making of 
senior Naval aviation leaders. The mission of the NAE is to advance and sustain Naval 
aviation warfighting capabilities at an affordable cost…today and in the future (NAE 
Strategic plan, 2012). 
 
Figure 7.  Evolution of the Naval Aviation Enterprise (from CNAF, 2013a) 
The NAE is comprised of over 190,000 Sailors, Marines, civilians and contract 
employees working together to support Naval aviation warfighting capability at an 
affordable cost (CNAF, 2013a). To accomplish their mission, the NAE is organized into 
air boards and cross functional teams (Figure 8). Air boards consist of senior military 
leaders who develop strategic guidance to drive the efforts of cross functional teams. 
Cross functional teams are groups of military, civilian, and contract personnel with 
disparate skills and backgrounds working within, across, and outside military chains of 
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command to develop solutions to pressing enterprise challenges (CNAF, 2013a). The 
NAE utilizes collaboration, transparency, detailed analysis, and a drive for continuous 
process improvement to provide aviation leadership with critical tools needed for 
informed decisions. The cultural mindset and motivation of NAE members are embodied 
by the following principles (CNAF, 2013a): 
• Consistently apply cross-functional process thinking 
• Establish and maintain process discipline 
• Use consistent, integrated, and hierarchical metrics 
• Ensure full and consistent transparency of data, information, and activities 
• Establish and maintain accountability for actions and results 
• Apply an integrated governance structure 
• Maintain a total ownership cost perspective 
• Tie efforts to a single fleet-driven metric: Naval aviation forces efficiently 
delivered for tasking. 
 
Figure 8.  NAE Organizational Structure (from CNAF, 2013) 
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The NAE aligns its endeavors with the Chief of Naval Operation’s strategic 
guidance by adopting the following NAE strategic objectives (CNAF, 2013a): 
• Enterprise culture and communication: Achieve a culture that emphasizes 
and rewards collaboration, ownership, transparency, and continuous 
improvement among enterprise stakeholders and partners in support of 
Naval aviation readiness.  
• Current readiness: Deliver combat-ready forces to meet current and future 
operational requirements at the optimal operations & support cost.  
• People: Enrich, shape, and deliver a proficient, diverse, and cost-effective 
total force that performs all of the functions required for Naval aviation to 
fight and win in combat.  
• Future readiness: Engage stakeholders to effectively produce required 
levels of future readiness while optimizing costs.  
• Cost management and external integration: Develop cost management 
products and metrics to reduce total ownership costs for legacy and 
transitioning weapon systems. Develop stronger integration and 
collaboration with other warfare enterprises with a focus on efficiency and 
cost reduction. 
The alignment of strategic objectives is shown in Figure 9. Figure 9 illustrates that 
the NAE exists outside the traditional structure of the Navy and Marine Corps but its 
guiding principles and strategic objectives are specifically fashioned to provide integrated 
support for the Navy’s strategic efforts. 
The NAE and others within Naval aviation have at least two tools available for 
cost analysis: The aviation financial analysis system (AFAST) and the aviation cost 
evaluation system (ACES) (CNAF, 2013a). 
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Figure 9.  NAE Strategic Alignment (from CNAF, 2013a) 
4. The Aviation Financial Analysis Tool 
AFAST provides a means to analyze and manage cost elements within the Naval 
aviation FHP. AFAST collects data from various reporting sources and combines them to 
generate reports and graphical charts for trend analysis. The analysis derived from 
AFAST is used by type wing and CNAF leadership to direct policy and focus cost 
management efforts (CNAF N422, 2003). 
Figure 10 shows the various data sources for AFAST and the three output tools. 
Targets and goals for the various cost elements are issued by the Commanders, Naval Air 
Forces Atlantic and Pacific based upon analysis of actual expenditures of the FHP 
provided by the Operational Plan 20 (OP-20) budget exhibit generated during the budget 
formulation process (Glenn & Otten, 2005). Fuel consumption rates and flight hour 
execution figures are collected from squadrons via their monthly budget operational 
targets report (CNAL, 1999). Budget operational target report data is aggregated and 
certified by ACES, the official flying hour cost reporting system for Naval aviation 
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(CNAF N422, 2003). Maintenance related costs are collected from NALCOMIS which 
tracks the maintenance actions and parts requisition at the organizational and 
intermediate levels (CNAF, 2013b). Information from the Department of Defense’s 
accounting system, the Standard Accounting and Reporting System-Field Level, is used 
to resolve conflicts with ACES and, in future upgrades, will be used to incorporate 
financial-only costs not recorded in NALCOMIS (i.e., contract costs, financial 
adjustments, carcass charges, non-NALCOMIS requisitions) (CNAF N422, 2003). The 
financial-only charges not captured by NALCOMIS and AFAST are estimated to never 
exceed 15 percent and historically have been less than five percent of FHP costs. It is 
estimated that AFAST captures 90 percent of FHP costs (CNAP N422, 2003). 
 
Figure 10.  AFAST Data Flow (from CNAF N422, 2003) 
Three tools generated by AFAST are the cockpit charts, AFAST-User, and the 
TWING tool (CNAF N422, 2003). The cockpit charts provide a graphical, executive  
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summary of FHP program costs broken down by its components and compared to the 
targets established by Commanders, Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific. An example 
can be seen in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11.  AFAST Cockpit Charts (from CNAF, 2013d) 
AFAST-User is a database tool providing summary cost per hour information 
across various levels of Naval aviation (CNAF N422, 2003). Summary information can 
be displayed by squadron, carrier air wing, Naval air station, type model, and type model 
series. The information can also be displayed by fiscal year, month, quarter, fiscal year to 
date, or a user selected time period. The information is divided among three categories: 
fuel, aviation depot level repairs, and aviation fleet maintenance. AFAST-User will show 
the executed cost versus a “should cost” figure based upon the OP-20 budget exhibit 
targets which are adjusted for historical trends and costs not captured by AFAST (CNAF 
N422, 2003). The percent variation of the executed cost from the “should cost” is 
displayed along with a color coded “stop light” indicator (CNAF N422, 2003). A cost per 
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hour for a given category that is on target or no more than five percent over targeted cost 
is displayed in green. Costs which are between five and 10 percent over targets are 
displayed in yellow. Those exceeding ten percent are displayed in red (CNAF N422, 
2003). 
 
Figure 12.  AFAST user Display (from CNAF, 2013d) 
5. Enterprise Airspeed 
Another element of cost saving initiatives by Naval aviation leadership is the 
AIRSpeed program. AIRSpeed is a combination of various corporate productivity and 
process improvement tools. AIRSpeed represents tools to assist with Naval aviation’s 
continuous process improvement efforts (CNAF, 2013f). 
The Naval Aviation Enterprise AIRSpeed initiative aims to improve performance 
of the aviation logistics system and the intermediate and depot level repair system using a 
blend of commercial practices including the Theory of Constraints, Lean, and Six Sigma 
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(Goldratt Institute, 2009). Enterprise AIRSpeed’s primary mission is to transform the 
maintenance and supply chain into an integrated, reliable, demand-pull based 
replenishment system (CNAF, 2013f). Enterprise AIRSpeed creates a common, 
integrated improvement effort across various units at multiple levels within the Naval 
aviation logistics and maintenance systems (CNAF, 2013f).  
The AIRSpeed concept began from improvement efforts at a Marine logistics 
squadron in Iwakuni, Japan in the late 1990s (CNAF, 2013f). The squadron’s successful 
application of the Theory of Constraints was recognized by leadership of the Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) and was adopted, eventually evolving into the NAE’s 
Enterprise AIRSpeed in 2003 (CNAF, 2013f). Enterprise AIRSpeed sought to transform 
the Naval aviation supply chain into a dynamic demand-pull supply chain while solving 
bottleneck challenges inside intermediate and depot maintenance facilities (CNAF, 
2013f). Implementation of the AIRSpeed initiative over the next several years yielded 
improvements in throughput at intermediate and depot maintenance facilities as well as 
efficiency gains throughout the supply chain (Goldratt Institute, 2009). AIRSpeed is a set 
of tools that Naval aviation uses to aid continuous process improvement (CPI) mandated 
by SECNAV instruction 5220.14 and CNAF instruction 4790.2B.   Enterprise AIRSpeed 
belongs to a family of NAE CPI activities including NAVAIR AIRSpeed, NAVICP 
AIRSpeed, and Depot AIRSpeed depicted in Figure 13. 
AIRSpeed initiatives have had success since 2003 (Broadus, Mallicoat, & Hardee, 
2007; Goldratt Institute, 2012). AIRSpeed projects implemented during the integration of 
intermediate and depot level maintenance facilities in 2006 were able to reduce Fleet 
Readiness Center Southwest’s time-to-reliably replenish from 138 days to 35 and saved 
over 5,300 overtime labor hours (Goldratt Institute, 2012). Marine Aviation Logistics 
Squadron 24 in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii used AIRSpeed initiatives to reduce their time-to-
reliably replenish from 224 days to 14, reduced their inventory by 66 percent, and 
improved throughput in multiple work centers (Goldratt Institute, 2012). Other advertised 
savings resulting from AIRSpeed include $13.9 million in the first quarter of fiscal year 
2007 (Broadus, Mallicoat, & Hardee, 2007). AIRSpeed adds to the increasing value of 
the Naval Aviation Enterprise concept. 
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Figure 13.  AIRSpeed Program Family (from Moore, 2007) 
B. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS 
Two systems which collect and measure performance data from strike fighter 
squadrons in a systematic and periodic manner are the Defense Readiness Reporting 
System and the Battle Effectiveness award. These two performance measurement 
systems are a factor driving the focus and behavior of squadrons. Their influence is 
important to understand in the context of this research. 
1. Defense Readiness Reporting System 
The Defense Readiness Reporting System is a standardized Department of 
Defense system which supports the Joint Chiefs of Staff in assessing and managing 
forces worldwide (CNAL, 2013). Readiness assessment is focused on a unit’s ability to 
perform mission essential tasks which support capability areas required to carry out 
missions during major combat operations (CJCS, 2010). Defense Readiness Reporting 
System-Navy (DRRS-N) assesses a Naval unit’s ability to achieve its required capability 
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level across five perspectives, known as pillars (CNAL, 2013). The five pillars are 
personnel, equipment, supply, training, and ordnance. Naval aviation units are only 
assessed in the personnel, equipment, and training pillars (CNAL, 2013). DRRS-N 
contains a computed assessment using data from a variety of authoritative sources and a 
commander’s assessment representing the commanding officer’s subjective opinion of 
the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission essential tasks, also known as Navy tactical 
tasks (NTA) (CNAL, 2013). The assessments are color coded and represent a statement 
of whether the unit can perform an assigned mission essential task to specific standards in 
specific conditions. Computed assessments in each pillar formulaically compare reported 
data to standards to quantify the capability in each NTA. The color codes are green for 
yes (80–100), yellow for qualified yes (60–79), and red for no (0–59). Figure 14 shows 
the DRRS-N assessment module.  
 
Figure 14.  DRRS-N Assessment Module (from CNAL, 2013) 
The personnel pillar assesses the unit’s ability to accomplish its assigned NTAs 
based on its manning (CNAL, 2013). The computed assessment calculates a personnel 
figure of merit for each NTA based on a ratio of current onboard personnel to a standard 
requirement. The ratio includes the number of officers, enlisted, Naval enlisted 
classification (job specialty), and training and education (advanced qualifications). 
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The equipment pillar compares the number of aircraft and missions systems 
capable of accomplishing the NTAs to the requirements for each NTA (CNAL, 2013). 
The equipment pillar uses a standard from a look-up table specific to each 
type/model/series aircraft to calculate the aviation maintenance figure of merit for each 
NTA. 
The training pillar assesses the aircrew’s ability to accomplish the unit’s NTAs 
(CNAL, 2013). The training figure of merit is calculated by multiplying a performance 
factor and an experience factor. The performance factor is the number of “skilled crews” 
divided by the required number of skilled crews in each NTA. To become skilled in an 
NTA, aircrew must complete a variety of specific tasks each flight that comprise skills 
(CSFWP, 2013)  The tasks must be completed a number of times within a certain period 
of time to achieve and maintain the skill. Each NTA has a specific combination of skills. 
Once a crew acquires all the skills within an NTA, they are considered skilled in that 
NTA (CSFWP, 2013). The experience factor is the ratio of squadron requirements section 
events completed to those events required. Required events include significant unit 
training evolutions during FRTP, aircrew qualification levels, and specific ordnance 
expenditures (CNAL, 2013).   
NTAs are grouped into capability areas and their assessments in each pillar are 
aggregated into one score and color per pillar. Each pillar score is then aggregated into an 
overall score for the capability areas. The commander’s assessment is entered manually 
and provides a means for commanders to communicate extenuating circumstances or 
obstacles to achieving required readiness levels (CNAL, 2013). The computed 
assessments are present to assist the commander in making his assessment. The 
commander’s assessment is the only information which is passed up through the system 
to the overall Defense Readiness Reporting System (CNAL, 2013). 
DRRS-N serves as the primary performance measurement system utilized by 
strike fighter squadrons (CNAF, 2011). All efforts within a squadron are focused on 
meeting the requirements in DRRS-N. Despite its importance, DRRS-N does little to 
assist a squadron in planning or managing operations (CSFWP, 2013). Readiness levels 
are expected to be “in the red” at certain points within the FRTP (CNAL, 2013). For 
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example, a unit in the maintenance phase of FRTP will be at approximately 50 percent 
funding and is expected to execute very little training relative to the deploy phase. The 
Training figure of merit for such a squadron would be expected to be red. As the 
squadron progresses through FRTP, the training figure of merit increases as funding and 
training increases (CNAL, 2013). The foundation of DRRS-N’s purpose is to assist a 
commanding officer in answering the question: “Is your unit capable of accomplishing its 
mission during major combat operations?” (CNAL, 2013).  DRRS-N does not assist the 
squadron in planning its operations, maintenance, and personnel management to get itself 
into a position where it can reply to that question with, “yes” (CSFWP, 2013). 
2. The Battle Efficiency Award 
The Commander of Naval Air Forces annually awards the Battle Efficiency award 
to one squadron in the Atlantic fleet and one in the Pacific fleet for each 
type/model/series of aircraft (CSFWP, 2012). The Battle Efficiency award (Battle “E”) is 
awarded to the squadron which demonstrates the highest “cost-wise” and performance 
readiness. Winners of the award may be regarded as the “best” squadron within their 
type/model/series community. Units winning the Battle “E” are authorized to paint a 
large “E” on their hangars and aircraft fuselages and their personnel are authorized to 
wear a uniform decoration signifying their role in the achievement (CSFWP, 2012). Such 
recognition can provide a strong incentive to win the award. 
  Units competing for the award are evaluated on 45 different criteria in two 
competitive areas, cost-wise readiness and performance readiness (CSFWP, 2012). The 
45 criteria are spread among categories and subcategories within each competitive area. 







Table 2.   Battle “E” Subcategory Weights (from CSFWP, 2012) 
Category Weight (Overall Weight) 
40% Cost-wise Readiness Metrics - 40 points 
 20% Aircraft Material Readiness (AMR) 
 20% Schedule Performance Index (SPI) 
60% Performance Readiness Metrics - 60 points 
 15% Operational Achievements 
  10% (1.5%) Carrier Landing Grade (Index) 
  10% (1.5%) Day Boarding Rate (Index) 
  10% (1.5%) Night Boarding Rate (Index) 
  20% (3.0%) Number of Operational Missions 
  10% (1.5%) Operational Mission Completion Rate 
  20% (3.0%) Total Embarked Hours 
  10% (1.5%) Total Night Carrier Landings 
  10% (1.5%) Actual Combat Expenditure 
 12% Training and Readiness 
  25% (3%) Non-FRP Exercise Mission Completion Rate 
  25% (3%) Weapons Training Efficiency 
  20% (2.4%) Simulator Utilization 
  30% (3.6%) SFWT Progress 
 6% Inspections 
  50% (3.0%) NATOPS Unit Evaluation 
  50% (3.0%) Conventional Weapons Technical Proficiency Inspect. 
 9% Material Readiness 
  20% (1.8%) Aviation Maintenance Inspection 
  20% (1.8%) Material Condition Inspection  
  20% (1.8%) Cannibalization Rate 
  20% (1.8%) NEC Fit 
  20% (1.8%) Qualified Proficient Technician (QPT) Fit 
 6% Personnel Readiness 
  30% (1.8%) Retention Rate - Zones A, B & C 
  20% (1.2%) Advancement Rate 
  10% (.6%) Passed but Not Advanced (PNA) Rate 
  20% (1.2%) Physical Readiness Standards 
  10% (.6%) Medical Readiness Score 
  10% (.6%) Health Promotion Score 
 6% Aviation Safety 
  20% (1.2%) Class A mishaps 
  10% (.6%) Class B mishaps 
  10% (.6) Chargeable FOD occurrences 
  10% (.6%) HAZREPS submitted 
  7% (.4%) NATOPS changes submitted 
  13% (.8%) NATOPS changes accepted 
  7% (.4%) Safety articles submitted 
  13% (.8%) Safety articles published 
  10% (.6%) NAMDRP reports submitted 
 3% Weapons and Tactics Development 
  10% (.3%) Tactical documents submitted 
  20% (.6%) Tactical documents published 
  20% (.6%) Tactical projects completed 
  7% (.2%) TACMAN changes submitted 
  13% (.4%) TACMAN changes accepted 
  10% (.3%) Professional articles submitted 
  20% (.6%) Professional articles published 
 3% General Contributions 
  33% (1%) Bomb Derby Participant 
  67% (2%) Bomb Derby Winner 
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The first competitive area is cost-wise readiness, comprised of two categories: 
aircraft material readiness and schedule performance index (CSFWP, 2012). Cost-wise 
readiness accounts for 40 of the 100 total points with each of its categories contributing 
50 percent. The cost-wise readiness categories are objective measurements of squadrons’ 
performance compared to an optimum goal that is common to all competing units. 
Aircraft material readiness is the average percentage of aircraft reported as “ready 
for tasking” versus the requirement for each month of the fiscal year. Ready-for-tasking 
(RFT) is the number of aircraft properly equipped and capable of carrying out operational 
and training requirements. RFT requirements for each squadron are dependent upon its 
timing within its fleet readiness training plan (FRTP). For example, a squadron six 
months into its FRTP (R+6), might have an RFT requirement of 5.63 aircraft. If that 
squadron is only reporting an average daily RFT number of five for that month, they 
would score 88.8. The average score over the 12 month competitive period is averaged to 
tally the total score for aircraft material readiness (CSFWP, 2012). 
Schedule performance index is the ratio of flight hours executed to flight hours 
granted (CSFWP, 2012). Each squadron is granted a specific number of flight hours to 
execute based upon its timing within the FRTP cycle. Flight hour grants occur quarterly 
and can be adjusted for extenuating circumstances beyond the squadron’s control (e.g., 
additional tasking, unusual events prohibiting training). Squadrons executing within five 
percent of their grant receive the maximum score; squadrons beyond five percent receive 
no points (CSFWP, 2012). 
The second competitive area is performance readiness (CSFWP, 2012). The scope 
of the performance readiness categories is broad and some subcategories lack established 
goals. As a result, each squadron’s score is calculated using a relative-ranking 
methodology (CSFWP, 2012). For each sub-category, the range of scores is divided into 
the overall weight of that sub-category (table one) to find a weight-per-range-point. The 
squadron’s score for the sub-category is found by multiplying the amount of points it 




the overall sub-category weight (CSFWP, 2012). In simple terms, the squadron which 
performs the best in a given subcategory is given the maximum score; all other squadrons 
are ranked relative to that performance level. 
Operational achievements is the first category in the performance readiness area 
(CSFWP, 2012). Its subcategories include metrics related to performance while deployed 
or engaged in combat and are as follows:  
• Squadron landing Grades (landings are graded only at sea using a four 
point scale) 
• Squadron boarding rate (Day) (ratio of arrested landings to attempted 
arrested landings) 
• Squadron boarding rate (Night) (same ratio but applied only to night 
arrested landings) 
• Deployed operational and combat missions (any flight while deployed is 
considered operational) 
• Deployed operational and combat mission completion rate (ratio of 
missions completed to missions scheduled) 
• Total embarked hours 
• Total night carrier landings 
• Actual combat expenditure (points given for different types of weapons 
employed during combat) 
• The training and readiness category includes metrics related to training 
directly related to readiness, aircrew qualifications, or non-FRTP 
exercises:  
• Mission completion rate for exercises and detachments (ratio of missions 
completed to those scheduled during non-FRTP exercise and detachments) 
• Weapons training efficiency (penalty points assessed for not meeting 
readiness requirements for each type of weapon) 
• Simulator utilization (ratio of simulator hours actually used to those 
scheduled) 
• SFWT progress (the number of aircrew who advance one strike fighter 




The inspections category includes scores recorded during inspections for Naval 
air training and operating procedures (NATOPS) unit evaluation and conventional 
weapons technical proficiency inspection (CSFWP, 2012). A unit receives full credit for 
passing the inspection, and no credit if failed. 
The material readiness category includes maintenance related inspection results, 
qualification achievement rates (QPT fit), and a metric which assesses the gaps of 
personnel required to fill various critical billets (NEC fit) (CSFWP, 2012). Scores for 
these metrics are compiled based on data previously reported to and contained in the 
Naval aviation readiness integrated improvement program database. 
• Aviation maintenance inspection (two points for each maintenance 
program graded “on track,” one point for “needs more attention,” zero 
points for “off track”) 
• Material condition inspection (two points for each aircraft passing 
inspection divided by total number of points possible) 
• Qualified proficient technician (QPT) fit (ratio of the number of qualified 
technicians to established standards) 
• The personnel readiness category contains metrics related to retention, 
advancement, physical fitness, and medical related metrics. 
• Retention rate (ratio of Sailors reenlisting to those at expiration of 
obligated service) 
• Advancement rate (ratio of Sailors E4-E6 who advance in rank to those 
who took the advancement exam) 
• Passed-not advanced rate (ratio of Sailors E4-E6 who passed the 
advancement exam but did not advance to those who took the exam) 
• Physical readiness (ratio of personnel who passed the physical readiness 
test to those eligible) 
• Medical readiness (scores based upon percentage of squadron personnel 
who fall into one of four medical readiness categories) 
• Health promotion score (percentage of satisfactory elements of a 
squadron’s health promotion program) 
• The safety category includes scores related to the number of mishaps or 
foreign object damage (FOD) events. It also includes scores based on the 
number of reports and change requests submitted to various safety-related 
organizations. 
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• Class alpha mishaps (100 point penalty for mishaps resulting in fatalities, 
permanent disability, or destruction of aircraft that are attributable to the 
squadron) 
• Class bravo mishaps (50 point deduction for mishaps resulting in partial 
permanent disability or the hospitalization of three or more personnel that 
are attributable to the squadron) 
• Foreign object debris (FOD) occurrences  (reportable FOD events 
attributable to the squadron) 
• Hazard reports submitted (number of hazard reports submitted) 
• NATOPS change requests submitted (number of change requests 
submitted to Naval air training and operating procedures standardization 
manuals) 
• NATOPS change requests accepted (number of change requests accepted) 
• Safety articles submitted (number of safety related articles submitted) 
• Safety articles published (number of safety related articles published) 
• Naval aviation maintenance discrepancy reports submitted (number of 
discrepancy reports submitted to Naval aviation maintenance program 
manuals or procedures) 
• The weapons and tactics development score includes the number of 
tactical documents, procedure changes, or professional articles submitted 
and/or published. 
• Tactical documents submitted (number of documents submitted to tactical 
journals) 
• Tactical documents published (number of documents published in tactical 
journals) 
• Tactical projects (number of projects enhancing strike fighter tactics or 
capabilities) 
• Tactical manual changes submitted (number of change requests submitted 
to tactical manuals) 
• Tactical manual changes accepted (number of change requests accepted) 
• Professional articles submitted (number of articles submitted to journalist 
media publications) 
• Professional articles published (number of articles published) 
The final category includes general contributions to the strike fighter community 
(CSFWP, 2012). This includes whether or not the squadron participated in and/or won 
the “bombing derby” (bombing competition). It also includes a section for the 
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commanding officer to write comments highlighting the squadron’s accomplishments or 
reconciling notable shortcomings outside the squadron’s control. 
To gather data for the award, the strike fighter wing sends out an Excel 
spreadsheet for the squadrons to enter data (CSFWP, 2012). A number of the metrics are 
self-reported by the squadron and some are pulled from various computer databases 
containing previous reports made throughout the fiscal year. To be eligible for the award, 
a squadron must first be endorsed by their carrier air wing commander (CSFWP, 2012). 
Spreadsheets are submitted to the strike fighter wing, scores are calculated, and a 
nominee is forwarded to Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific and Atlantic for final 
decision and announcement (CSFWP, 2012). 
Despite its prestige, one might argue the battle “E” is not without its 
shortcomings. A number of the measures can only be achieved at a competitive level 
while deployed (CSFWP, 2012), others are not controlled by the squadron (CSFWP, 
2012), and a number could be argued as being unnecessary or unimportant. Some of the 
measures, however, might be useful in a balanced scorecard. 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
As the fiscal pressures of budget reductions mount, balancing reducing squadron 
operating costs with the need to remain ready and capable is likely to be a challenge. This 
thesis proposes adopting a tool long embraced by the business community to do just that. 
Companies have used the balanced scorecard to clarify their strategy, identify objectives 
to support that strategy, and communicate their strategy throughout all levels of the 
organization. The strike fighter balanced scorecard provides a practical tool squadrons 
can use to accomplish CNAF’s mission of producing the right readiness at a reduced cost, 
without sacrificing their effectiveness. 
D. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
This thesis took a pragmatic approach to adapt the balanced scorecard to a strike 
fighter squadron. The approach began with a thorough review of the salient literature 
describing the concepts and applications of the balanced scorecard. Structured interviews 
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allowed identification of links between the strategies of Naval aviation’s leadership and 
the priorities of operational commanders. The interviews also revealed perceptions of 
success within the strike fighter community and identified objectives and measures best 
to achieve it. The balanced scorecard was then adjusted to fit the military environment 
and fashioned into an easy-to-use tool. Finally, this thesis provides recommendations for 
implementing the strike fighter balanced scorecard, a system to perpetuate its use 
throughout the fleet, and a method of feedback and adjustment to maintain its relevance. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BALANCED SCORECARD        
Since its development, the balanced scorecard has been adopted by hundreds of 
companies throughout the world and was named one of the most influential management 
ideas of the past 75 years by the editors of the Harvard Business Review (2013). 
Application methods and guidelines for the balanced scorecard are as diverse as the 
interpretations of the concepts originally expressed by its authors (Brewer, Davis, & 
Albright, 2005; Niven, 2003; Bush, 2005). Diverse methods and interpretations have led 
to many failures and pose myriad pitfalls to would-be adopters (Norreklit, Jacobsen, and 
Mitchell, 2008; Schneiderman, 1999; Cokins, 2010). Many governmental agencies 
(Niven, 2003), including some in the Department of Defense (Cavoli, 2004), have 
adopted the balanced scorecard but examples within available literature were at high 
levels in the organizational structure (e.g., echelon 2/3, budget submitting office) and 
little information could be identified about applications below them. This review analyzes 
current literature regarding basic concepts of the scorecard, application methods, 
peculiarities associated with its use in government, and common pitfalls. 
1. Balanced Scorecard Basics 
The balanced scorecard is an integrated, balanced management system that 
translates an organization’s strategy into external and internal objectives and measures 
such that each member of the organization understands their part in achieving the 
organization’s mission. The balanced scorecard was developed by Robert Kaplan and 
David Norton in the early 1990s as an improvement or advancement over other similar 
concepts such as the corporate scorecard developed by Arthur Schneiderman (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996, p. vii).   Kaplan and Norton’s research questioned how well firms were 
measuring performance. Initial findings suggested that firms were too focused on short-
term financial measures and lacked an ability to develop consistent plans to achieve long-
term growth. They concluded that a reliance on financial performance measures was 
inadequate to evaluate or direct a firm’s path toward competitive advantage (Kaplan & 
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Norton, 1996). Through their research and pilot programs conducted by research partners, 
they produced the balanced scorecard to address the shortcomings of current performance 
measurement and management systems. 
The balanced scorecard derives its balance by incorporating internal and external 
considerations, leading and lagging performance indicators, and objective and subjective 
measures. The balance is created by identifying objectives and measures within four 
perspectives that support the firm’s strategy. Kaplan and Norton (1996) list the four 
perspectives as financial, customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth. 
The financial perspective contains objectives relating to profitability (e.g., operating 
income, economic value added, return on equity employed). Customer measures, such as 
customer satisfaction, are intended to measure the company’s performance from the 
customer’s perspective. Internal business process measures reflect core competencies, 
recognize strengths and shortcomings, and identify areas for improvement. A key feature 
of this perspective is that it may include processes that the firm does not currently carry 
out; it focuses on what processes should be executed to support the strategy. The learning 
and growth perspective contains measures that relate to the people, systems, and 
organizational procedures that must be supported to ensure long-term improvement and 
growth.   
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Figure 15.  Balanced Scorecard Perspectives (from Kaplan & Norton, 1996) 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) point out that the four perspectives are a starting point 
and can be modified as needed to accurately represent the perspectives most critical to the 
firm’s value chain. The balanced scorecard helps management identify objectives within 
each of the four perspectives that support the firm’s strategy. Quantitative and qualitative 
measures that indicate progress in achieving the objectives are then identified. The 
measures must be tied to the objectives in a causal relationship and should span all four 
perspectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). The objectives and measures should be 
formulated in such a way that, when pieced together, they clearly describe the firm’s 




to specific actions that can be taken by employees to impact the firm’s success. The entire 
process creates a direct line of influence all the way from the firm’s strategic goals down 
to the actions of individuals throughout the firm. 
2. Application of the Balanced Scorecard 
The balanced scorecard has been applied in many industries and in many ways 
since its development (e.g., Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Carr & Gratton, 2001, Niven 2003). 
Research by the Hackett Group (Williams, 2004, p. 19) indicates that successful balanced 
scorecards have six common characteristics: 
• Focus: They are designed as a day-to-day diagnostic tool to guide 
executive actions and are not tied to compensation. 
• Balance: They have a mix of leading and lagging indicators tied to internal 
and external financial and operating metrics. 
• Scope: They provide a limited number of balanced metrics which support 
and help explain strategy. They are updated as data and the environment 
changes. 
• Audience: They adapt to their audience. Many firms develop multiple 
scorecards for business units or individual employees. All must be tied to 
firm strategy. 
• Technology: They match technology delivery to the need for timeliness in 
reporting and analysis. 
• Implementation: They are phased in by division or level incrementally. 
Once the scorecard is mature at one level, it can be introduced in the next 
level. 
While the six characteristics may make sense, there are multiple views in the 
literature regarding the first characteristic of focus. In the list, we are led to believe that 
research indicates that a successful balanced scorecard is not tied to compensation. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) state early in their book, “The balanced scorecard should be 
used as a communicating, informing, and learning system, not a controlling system” (p. 
25). Later in the same book, however, they assert, “Ultimately, for the scorecard to create 
the cultural change, incentive compensation must be connected to achievement of 
scorecard objectives. The issue is not whether, but when and how” (Kaplan & Norton, 
1996, p. 217). In their second book, The Strategy Focused Organization, Kaplan and 
Norton (2001) devote an entire chapter to the concept of the balanced paycheck. Their 
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research indicated that 88 percent of 214 companies which tied compensation to their 
balanced scorecard did so effectively. They go on to acknowledge that such a connection 
is contingent upon the scorecard process being mature enough to ensure that the 
appropriate measures have been selected, the data are reliable, and objectives and strategy 
have not produced unintended consequences.   
Others have developed guidelines to follow when utilizing the balanced scorecard 
as a means of evaluating the performance of an employee or determining compensation 
(Albright, Burgess, Hibbets, & Roberts, 2010a, 2010b). All of the reviewed literature 
indicates that selection of performance measures is the critical piece to evaluating 
business units or individuals. Measures must be carefully selected to avoid behavioral 
displacement and perceptions of comparative inequity. Employees should be included in 
the process of selecting performance measures and targets. Targets for the measures 
should be clearly defined, challenging yet attainable, and within the control of the 
employee (Brewer et al., 2005).   
Four steps have been identified to ensure the measures are effective in 
communicating priorities and providing a way to compare and evaluate employee 
performance (Albright et al., 2010a). Each measure should be individually evaluated 
using an appropriate point scale. Weights should be assigned to the measures 
commensurate with their importance in supporting strategy and tailored to the individual 
or his position. Once each measure has a weighted score, the scores are added up to 
create an aggregate overall score representing the success or failure in achieving the 
targeted measures. Finally, the evaluator should have some discretion to alter the scores 
to account for events out of the control of the employee or for extenuating circumstances. 
To guard against perceptions of favoritism, the evaluator should be required to justify his 
or her departure from the standard (Albright et al., 2010a). 
In his book, Rethinking Performance Measurement, Marshall Meyer (2002) 
argues against the balanced scorecard on the basis of performance measurement. Meyer 
contends that performance measurement, as approached by the balanced scorecard, is 
flawed for two reasons. The first reason is due to the nature of organizations. He argues 
that it is impossible to accurately disentangle the interdependencies of business processes 
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to clearly identify cause and effect. The second reason is the nature of people. Behavioral 
displacement can be a problem in any management control system, especially in the 
balanced scorecard if measures are poorly chosen. Meyer uses an analogy of a teacher 
“teaching to the test” to illustrate the point. Because the nature of organizations prohibits 
one from accurately identifying the measures that directly cause the objectives to be met, 
there is invariably some inherent error as well as gamesmanship by the employee held 
accountable for the measure (Meyer, 2002).   
Meyer (2002) also points out that the competitive business environment can 
change so rapidly that even an accurately selected measure today may not retain its cause 
and effect relationship tomorrow. Moreover, measurement performance can run-down 
over time as result of learning to a point where it is impossible to determine good from 
bad performers. Meyer (2002) provides an example using analysis of major league 
baseball batting averages. The average batting averages remained roughly the same from 
1876 to 1980 but the variance dropped dramatically. As the skill of most players 
increased and the selection criteria for recruitment were refined, batting average became 
less of an effective measure by which to evaluate the quality of a player (Meyer, 2002). If 
nothing else, this highlights the importance of feedback and constant vigilance to 
recognize when measures must be adjusted or changed entirely. 
Additional problems may arise when the balanced scorecard is used to evaluate 
employee performance or determine compensation levels. Measures in a balanced 
scorecard may be qualitative and must be interpreted subjectively by the evaluator. 
Therefore, the link between employee performance and compensation may become 
unclear as the measures are aggregated to determine performance or compensation. 
Feelings of inequity among employees may result from the ensuing differences in 
compensation. Conversely, if the compensation or evaluation is tied to quantitative 
measures in a formulaic way, employees can be expected to employ some form of 
gamesmanship to enhance their compensation or performance marks (Meyer, 2002). 
Still, others argue the balanced scorecard can be used for performance evaluation 
of business units and individuals successfully if the following five requirements are met 
(Albright et al., 2010b, pp.69–70): 
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• Fairness or equality in the assessment process 
• Communication to understand organizational goals and individual 
contributions to the goals 
• Involvement by those being evaluated in the development of measures and 
standards  
• Challenging yet attainable goals 
• Meaningful reward system 
The process of building a balanced scorecard also varies among some authors. For 
example, Kaplan and Norton (1996) instruct a firm to begin with selecting the appropriate 
organizational unit and identifying the linkages between the unit and the top corporate 
level. The linkages with the corporate level are important to ensure alignment with the 
organization’s mission, vision, values, and strategy. The process then moves on to 
identifying objective in each of the four perspectives that support the strategy. Groups of 
team members then develop specific measures that cause the objectives to progress in 
support of the strategy. After debate and consensus on the above elements, the team then 
develops an implementation plan (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Kaplan and Norton (2001) 
later added the concept of constructing a strategy map to facilitate the early steps of the 
process and to assist in visualizing the interdependencies of the strategy, perspectives, 
objectives, and measures. 
Differing from Kaplan and Norton, Brewer et al. (2005) developed an eleven-step 
process utilizing a business modeling approach to facilitate the successful construction of 
a balanced scorecard. The process developed by Brewer et al. differs from that of Kaplan 
and Norton by not directly addressing mission, vision, values, and strategy. The eleven-
step process seems to implicitly derive the strategy through the questions a firm must 
answer at each step in the process. This approach may very well help avoid confusion 
caused by misinterpretations or misidentifications of the mission, vision, values, or 
strategy espoused by corporate leaders.       
The process developed by Brewer et al. (2005) provides an otherwise absent 
methodology for accurately identifying measures with a cause-and-effect relationship 
with strategic objectives (Figure 16). The process begins in phase one where managers 
define financial goals, customers, processes, and asset inputs. The second phase then 
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identifies cause-and-effect relationships between business model components identified 
in the first phase. In the third phase, performance measures are selected for each of the 
four scorecard perspectives that support the business model components and overall firm 
strategy. A key point in their eleven step process is that performance measures are not 
selected until step seven. Brewer et al. (2005) argue that the success of the balanced 
scorecard can be jeopardized by premature selection of performance measures that are 
not causally linked to the business model components or the objectives that support 
strategy.  
 
Figure 16.  Business Modeling Framework (from Brewer et al., 2005) 
Identifying measures that truly have a cause-and-effect relationship with 
objectives that facilitate the achievement of an organization’s strategy is challenging, 
especially when objectives and measures are non-financial or qualitative. As a result, 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) stress the importance of feedback and strategic learning. The 
strategic learning process allows decision makers to evaluate the validity of measures, 
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objectives, and the overall strategy. The strategic learning process should collect data to 
assess whether implementation of the strategy will achieve the organization’s mission 
and test the relationships between the measures and objectives. Once data are collected 
and analyzed, a team of individuals from various levels within the organization must 
move to appropriately adjust the balanced scorecard. Adjustments are necessary to ensure 
the effectiveness of driving the actions employees take to achieve organizational goals 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
The frequency and scope of scorecard adjustment varies significantly from firm to 
firm. However, balanced scorecard adjustment is asserted as a necessity by Kaplan and 
Norton in their first two books. Their approach to strategic learning mitigates Meyer’s 
criticism of performance measure run-down. Niven (2003) described a benchmarking 
study in which 62 percent of participants modified their scorecards annually, 15 percent 
biannually, and 23 percent every three months. Twenty-five percent of measures were 
found to be changed when firms updated their scorecards (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). The 
magnitude and periodicity of change required to sustain the benefits of the balanced 
scorecard may be a trouble area for its application to military units. Rapid and frequent 
changes to measures will likely be difficult to manage across multiple units. Careful 
assessments of the appropriate unit level scope and whether or not a scorecard can be 
standardized across multiple units in a military organization will be essential to further 
study.   
3. Government Application Specifics 
Application of the balanced scorecard in the private sector is generally motivated 
by a desire to achieve financial objectives while competing in complex environments 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996). In the public sector, motivations are different (Niven, 2003). 
Sometimes, government agencies choose the balanced scorecard as a means to comply 
with the Government Performance and Result Act, which requires agencies to set goals, 




process the Veterans Benefits Administration undertook to apply the balanced scorecard 
to comply with the Government Performance and Result Act and increase its 
effectiveness.   
Others looked toward the balanced scorecard as a way to drive transformation to 
meet dramatic changes in the external environment or increase their effectiveness in 
accomplishing their mission (Johnson, 2005). Empirical evidence supports the notion that 
the need for transformation is particularly suited to the balanced scorecard (MacBryde, 
Raton, Grant, & Bayliss, 2012). Bush (2005) argues that the balanced scorecard approach 
is a change process and a not a measurement process. He goes on to say that if a balanced 
scorecard is installed for the sole reason of performance measurement, it is destined for 
failure.   
Others adopt the balanced scorecard to provide focus in a world awash with 
unconnected streams of data (Cavoli, 2004). Department of Defense Special Assistant to 
the Secretary and Director for Program Analysis & Evaluation, Ken Krieg, sums up such 
aspirations by stating, “We measure everything, but by measuring everything and 
aligning nothing at senior levels, we really measure nothing” (Cavoli, 2004, p.10). 
Despite a variety of examples and case studies of government agencies adopting 
the balanced scorecard, no examples could be found of its application by a low-level 
(e.g., Navy echelon 4 or 5) military combat unit. The U.S. Army implemented the 
balanced scorecard in what it called the strategic readiness system in 2001, but it 
cascaded down to only the brigade level (Johnson, 2005). The apparent lack of research 
in this area is particularly troubling to the scope of this study because no direct 
comparisons can be made between this effort and others. A combat unit does not have 
customers in the same context as a service unit. While a service unit may provide 
products to a combat unit (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency provides parts for aircraft 
repair), the combat unit provides combat effectiveness to its immediate commander. This 
difference is not specifically addressed in the literature, but there are some similar 
situations faced by other government agencies when adopting the balanced scorecard. 
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The differences between government agency and corporate focus and operating 
environment can take multiple forms. Financial perspectives within the government are 
quite different than those in a private firm. A private firm seeks to maximize shareholder 
wealth; a mission funded government agency seeks to provide the most service while 
exhausting its appropriated budget authority; and an agency funded through a working 
capital fund seeks only to recover its costs to show no loss or gain at the end of the 
period. Because of these differences, the customer perspective is given a higher priority 
than the financial perspective (Niven, 2003). Moreover, multiple stakeholders may be 
critical to the agency’s success or may serve simultaneously as customer, supplier, and 
partner. For this reason, the agency may need to alter the scorecard perspectives to suit its 
particular operating environment.   
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center acknowledged that the fleet it serves acts as 
a customer in one sense and a stakeholder in another; it added a fifth perspective for 
stakeholders to make a clear distinction (Niven, 2003). The Dallas Family Access 
Network modified their perspective considerably to better represent their purpose. Their 
perspectives were health care, social services, operational, consumer, and financial. Two 
thirds of all subjects in a study described by Niven (2003) chose not to alter the 
perspectives provided with Kaplan and Norton’s balanced scorecard. Balanced scorecard 
perspectives should be based on what is necessary to tell the firm’s strategic story (Niven, 
2003).   
Whittaker’s (2001) book, Balanced Scorecard in the Federal Government, 
provides examples of successful government applications of the balanced scorecard but 
does not provide details on the selection of perspectives, objectives, or measures. Kaplan 
and Norton (1996, 2001) provide some guidance on dealing with governmental 
differences in both of their books. Because success is not based on financial terms, a 
government agency must elevate the customer or stakeholder to be the highest priority 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Success in the public sector is based upon how effectively and 
efficiently an agency provides its services to its constituents, so strategy must support that 
end (Kaplan & Norton, 2001).   
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The application of the balanced scorecard to a Navy strike fighter squadron in this 
study will help close the gap in some of the knowledge regarding how government 
agencies modify the balanced scorecard to best suit their environment. 
4. Challenges to Implementing a Balanced Scorecard 
The path to a successful application of the balanced scorecard is beset by many 
perils. Recent research reveals that 70 percent of balanced scorecard initiatives are 
abandoned within two years (Carr & Graton, 2013). A majority of the literature reviewed 
agrees on many core issues, but there is some divergence. Some of the literature focuses 
on the author’s experience (e.g., Schneiderman, 1999); some are case studies focusing on 
one application (e.g., Rompho, 2011); and a few actually represent studies involving 
many firms (e.g., Car & Gratton, 2013). Many of the factors leading to failures outlined 
in the literature have direct and significant implications on the potential application of the 
balanced scorecard to a Navy strike fighter squadron. Strike fighter squadrons have high 
personnel turnover rates, operate in disparate environments from one another, and enjoy 
decentralized management control. The implications of those factors will need to be 
carefully considered throughout the study. The following sections discuss various pitfalls 
associated with developing and implementing a balanced scorecard. 
When Kaplan and Norton wrote their book, The Strategy Focused Organization, 
in 2001, it had been five years since their first book and over ten years since the first 
adoption of the balanced scorecard. They devote an entire chapter to avoiding the pitfalls 
(Kaplan & Norton, 2001 p. 355). Kaplan and Norton (2001) described three contributing 
factors common to balanced scorecard failures.  “Transitional issues” is their first factor, 
and according to Kaplan and Norton, it results mostly from the attrition of scorecard 
champions. As firms are acquired and the management or organization is changed, the 
high-level support for the balanced scorecard is often compromised. Sometimes, CEOs 
are involuntarily replaced, their balanced scorecard initiatives are often replaced as well 




second factor affecting balanced scorecard failure. Design failures result when the 
measures and objectives do not tell the story of the organization’s strategy and can take 
multiple forms: 
• Too many or too few measures 
• Failure to balance leading and lagging measures 
• Selecting measures without a specific link to objectives 
• Scorecards among different business units that do not align with 
organizational strategy 
The third factor, “process failures,” is most often responsible for balanced 
scorecard failures (Kaplan & Norton, 2001, p. 361). Process failures relate to deficiencies 
in the implementation of the scorecard and can take the following forms: 
• Lack of management commitment 
• Too few individuals involved 
• Keeping the scorecard at the top (not cascading it to the lower levels of the 
organization) 
• Taking too long to develop the scorecard or viewing it as a one-time 
process 
• Treating the balanced scorecard as a systems project 
• Hiring inexperienced consultants to assist in development and execution 
• Using the balanced scorecard only for the purpose of calculating 
compensation 
One pitfall not addressed by Kaplan and Norton (2001) is the concept of 
gamesmanship (Meyer 2002). Gamesmanship arises because performance measures 
almost never perfectly reflect employees’ actions and contributions to overall objectives. 
Imperfect measures may cause employees to take actions that enhance the measure for 
their own self-gain while negatively affecting strategy or their peers’ performance.  This 
theme occurs in other literature, specifically Norreklit, Jacobsen, and Mitchell (2008) and 
Mintchik and Blaskovich (2008). Kaplan and Norton (1996) provide an early warning in 
their first book stating that the balanced scorecard should be used as a communicating, 




they later qualify that statement to say that the balanced scorecard should not be tied to 
compensation or reward until it is mature and the measures and objectives have been 
verified.   
Tied to the concept of gamesmanship is the tendency for management to 
impatiently monitor employee performance (Cokins, 2010). By doing so, they 
compromise the causal links between measures and strategy, thus creating an 
environment ripe for gamesmanship. Albright et al. (2010a) provide a four step process to 
guard against such impatience by management, as well as the complexities involved in 
combining multiple performance measures. Schneiderman (1999) points out that 
employee involvement in the development of measures and goals is critical to avoid 
situations and perceptions that lead to gamesmanship and micromanaging. Kaplan and 
Norton (1996, p.250) devote a chapter to feedback and strategic learning describing a 
number of efforts firms can employ to identify and correct for deficiencies in the initial 
design of a balanced scorecard. 
Transitional issues are particularly lethal factors in failure of the balanced 
scorecard. Kaplan and Norton (2001) and Carr and Gratton (2013) describe a number of 
cases where leadership in a firm changed, leaving support for the balanced scorecard 
vulnerable. Whether identified as a transitional issue or an organizational dynamic, the 
loss of leaders committed to the success of the balanced scorecard led to its demise in 
every case. Carr and Gratton (2013) reference six sources they consider “significant 
research” and assert that their conclusions are based upon case studies from the field. 
How many cases contribute to their conclusions is unclear. What is particularly 
disturbing about transitional issues is that none of the sources suggested an effective 
response. Carr and Gratton (2013) briefly mention a “succession plan” but fail to 
elaborate on how to implement the plan. The implications of this factor appear to be 
important for the balanced scorecard application to a Navy strike fighter squadron. 
Leadership changes every fifteen months within a squadron, so attention to the poignancy 
of this factor will need to be given during the course of the study. 
Another relatively common pitfall described in the literature relates to strategy. 
Difficulties related to the definition and formulations of strategy have been well-
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documented over the years and are arguably beyond the scope of the balanced scorecard. 
Despite that, it is important to review how relevant literature views strategy as it relates to 
the balanced scorecard. While Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 37) do not approach the 
subject of selecting strategy, they do define it:  
...choosing the market and customer segments the business unit intends to 
serve, identifying the critical internal business processes that the unit must 
excel at to deliver the value propositions to customers in the targeted 
market segments, and selecting the individual and organizational 
capabilities required for the internal, customer, and financial objectives.   
Kaplan and Norton also assert their definition is in-line with the ideas of the 
widely recognized business author, Michael Porter (1996). Niven (2003, pp. 129–130) 
defines strategy as “…the broad priorities adopted by an organization in recognition of its 
operating environment and pursuit of its mission.” Brewer et al. (2005) do not even 
mention identifying strategy during their eleven-step process to apply the balanced 
scorecard. Why the difference, and why does it matter?  One explanation is that the 
differences lie in the different perspectives. Kaplan and Norton’s perspective was 
arguably tilted more toward large corporate businesses operating in intensely competitive 
environments that were likely well versed on the idea of business strategy. Niven’s 
(2003) book is directed at government and non-profit organizations operating in a much 
different environment. Brewer et al. (2005, pp. 29–30) avoid the topic directly, 
presumably because of the well documented difficulties of executives to agree on strategy 
(e.g., Ambrosini & Bowman, 2003; Porter, 1996), but rather approach it indirectly. The 
first four steps of their process are: 
• Define financial success (e.g., revenue growth, profit margin, cash flow) 
• Define the customer value proposition 
• Define processes that facilitate customer value proposition 
• Identify the tangible and intangible assets that enable process excellence 
Comparing their first four steps to the definition of strategy provided by Kaplan 
and Norton, one can see that they lead the organization down the same road but in an 
indirect, methodical way. These differences have distinct implications on the application 
of the balanced scorecard to a Navy strike fighter squadron. Selecting a definition or a 
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process to identify the appropriate strategy for a military combat unit, from a 
management perspective, is not well addressed within the literature identified. 
Regardless of how firms identify or define their strategy, the studies seem to agree 
that failure to review and update strategy and performance measures spell certain doom 
for the balanced scorecard. While Kaplan and Norton (2001) do not address it directly as 
a pitfall, the concept of feedback and strategic learning outlined in their first book, when 
followed properly, forgoes such a threat. That would indicate that a significant pitfall in 
applying the balanced scorecard is not precisely following the process provided by 
Kaplan and Norton. This is supported by Cokins, (2010) who asserts there is much 
confusion on what exactly constitutes a balanced scorecard. It would be difficult to 
properly execute the application of a balanced scorecard if executives do not agree on 
what it is, let alone knowing they need to update it. That may be why Cokins (2010) 
asserts that the strategy map is the most important part of the process. If the executives 
cannot agree on the strategy, they certainly will not make it past the strategy map. 
The relation between non-financial measures and financial outcomes is a well-
researched topic in the literature (Ittner, Larcker & Meyer, 2003).  Schneiderman (1999) 
states the time between an improvement in non-financial measures and a discernible 
impact on the firm’s financial performance can be as much as five to ten years and 
demands patience and discipline to endure such a lag time. While the empirical nature of 
his statement is questionable, it is supported in other work. Norreklit et al. (2008) point to 
the impatience of management that leads to abandonment of the balanced scorecard 
because of great lag times between measures and financial improvement. They also point 
out that firms must evaluate whether the cost to meet the non-financial objectives is 
outweighed by the increase in financial performance.   
Meyer (2002) attempts to refute the existence of connections between non-
financial performance measures and firm financial performance. He contends that 
external influences can quickly overpower any link between a non-financial measure and 
a firm’s financial performance. For example, one could meet objectives relating to 
customer satisfaction and operating efficiency but still see a drop in profits if external 
market forces alter the competitive environment (e.g., substitution resulting from 
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innovation by competitors). Schneiderman (1999, p. 10) calls the link between non-
financial measures and firm financial performance a leap of faith, “We do these the non-
financial things because it is the collective wisdom of the organizations that they will 
improve our chances of success.”  There is a distinct lack of empirical evidence in the 
reviewed literature to resolutely evaluate connections between non-financial measures 
and financial outcomes. 
The literature suggests that the most pervasive factor leading to balanced 
scorecard failures is improper performance measure selection (Norreklit et al., 2008; 
Rompho, 2011; Kaplan & Norton, 2001). A critical concept that holds the balanced 
scorecard together is the cause and effect relationship between the performance measures 
and the strategic objectives. If improving the measures does not accomplish the 
objectives, the whole process is for naught. While the literature seems to agree that 
failing to properly select key performance measures leads to ruin, there is not agreement 
on how to specifically avoid such failure. 
The literature contained a variety of methods for selecting measures. Brewer et al. 
(2005) provide a methodical approach to developing measures through a series of if-then 
statements utilized in their eleven-step business modeling approach. Wu (2012) utilizes 
the decision making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATL) to provide an analytical 
approach to determining cause and effect relationships between measures and objectives. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) provide guidance for ex-post analysis to verify the links 
between measures and objectives, but offer few details on how to determine the links 
during design. Regardless of method, or lack thereof, the authors reviewed agree that a 
practitioner must approach the balanced scorecard as an iterative process that must be 
continually evaluated and adjusted. This has distinct implications on applying a 
standardized balanced scorecard to Navy strike fighter squadrons. The natural turnover in 
personnel within a squadron and the bureaucratic process that would likely be needed to 
change a standardized scorecard pose hurdles in light of these pitfalls. 
 48 
B. SUMMARY 
In summary, there is empirical evidence supporting the benefits and effectiveness 
of the balanced scorecard improving the performance of a firm. Applying the balanced 
scorecard is more of an art than a science due to the disparate nature of firms and the 
environments in which they operate. While many government agencies have adopted the 
balanced scorecard, Niven’s (2003) examples provide little assistance to an application 
for a Navy strike fighter squadron. Many of the common pitfalls leading to failures of the 
balanced scorecard pose challenges for the application to a Navy strike fighter squadron. 
The data provided by this study should contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the 
flexibility of balanced scorecard applications and methods for identifying and 








Because of the differences between civilian business and the military, the process 
of adapting the balanced scorecard to a strike fighter squadron cannot precisely follow 
the steps described by Kaplan and Norton (1996) or Brewer et al. (2005).  Finding a way 
to harness all the potential benefit of a successful scorecard while avoiding the myriad 
pitfalls of its application posed challenges for the researcher. The researcher exerted 
effort to thoughtfully consider the complexities of the military environment and how the 
concepts within the reviewed literature could be translated to it in a meaningful and 
practical way. 
B. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The research strategy focused on the goal to develop a practical framework for 
strike fighter squadrons to deliver the right readiness at a reduced cost. The researcher 
structured this study to follow Kaplan and Norton’s process as closely as possible while 
making alterations as required for a military application. The researcher chose to follow 
Kaplan and Norton’s process because it required fewer adjustments than Brewer et al. 
(2005) and is the model upon which others reviewed are based (e.g., Niven, 2003). 
To achieve the goals of this thesis, the research needed to answer several 
questions necessary for the application of the balanced scorecard. First, how do various 
stakeholders perceive success for a strike fighter squadron?  Second, what objectives 
support this vision of success and align squadron outcomes with Naval aviation 
leadership’s mission?  Finally, based upon the definition of success and the specific 
objectives identified in the first two research phases, how might one formulate a practical 
balanced scorecard for a strike fighter squadron? 
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C. STUDY DESIGN 
The research strategy provided a basis for designing a systematic approach to this 
adaptation of the balanced scorecard. The following steps taken represent a logical and 
practical approach spanning from the preliminary literature review to the refinement of a 
useful scorecard: 
• Literature review: The researcher conducted an extensive review of 
available publications on the theory, applications, and successes and 
failures of the balanced scorecard. The review revealed cautionary signals 
that were heeded during the development of the research strategy and 
design. 
• Incorporate researcher knowledge: The researcher spent approximately ten 
years in mid-level management within strike fighter squadrons. The 
knowledge gained from reviewing the literature and spending a decade 
within the strike fighter community provided a reasonable knowledge base 
to design interviews for data collection and the appropriate adaptation of 
the balanced scorecard framework to a squadron. 
• Data collection: The researcher collected qualitative data to answer the 
first two questions identified in the research strategy. Quantitative data 
were collected from documentary sources to provide stretch targets for a 
number of measures during development of the scorecard. Qualitative data 
were analyzed by grouping common responses to interview questions or 
commons themes within discussions. Due to the limited number of 
participants and the nature of the questions, the researcher chose not to use 
coding for qualitative analysis. 
• Findings: The researcher reported findings drawn from analysis of the 
data. The findings from interviews were critical to properly adjusting the 
scorecard framework and replicating a process that would otherwise be 
conducted in a group meeting (i.e., business unit groups identifying 
measures to support objectives in a scorecard). 
• Develop preliminary framework: The researcher brought together the 
knowledge gained in the literature review, his own experience and 
knowledge of strike fighter squadrons, and the findings from data analysis 
to construct a preliminary balanced scorecard framework. 
• Respondent feedback: The researcher coordinated the critical feedback 
loop described by Kaplan and Norton. Original respondents were 
consulted and adjustments were made based on the frequency of specific 
feedback or the strength of logic in their arguments. Such feedback and 
adjustments were critical to maintaining the trustworthiness of the 
balanced scorecard. 
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• Final report: The researcher compiled all the results and products of the 
study into this thesis. 
D. DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
This study used two methods of collecting data:  
• Documentary evidence.   
• Structured interviews. 
The documentary evidence was collected from Navy directives, instructions, 
historical reporting data found in various Navy databases, and previously submitted 
entries for the Battle “E” award to identify appropriate targets for use in the balanced 
scorecard. 
The researcher designed a structured interview to answer the questions necessary 
to apply the scorecard and assess alignment of priorities between operational and 
administrative leaders within Naval aviation. The researcher crafted the questions to lead 
respondents, who might not be familiar with the balanced scorecard, along a path similar 
to Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) process of building a balanced scorecard. The interview 
questions also sought to explore respondents’ perceptions of priorities and guidance 
communicated to squadrons. Three questions sought to elicit respondent opinions of 
whether the Battle “E” award is a signal for success or a suitable source for some 
measures. The researcher provided interviewees with an “if-then drivers” diagram 
(Figure 18) to guide their selection of cause and effect relationships between objectives. 
Interview protocol can be viewed in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17.  Structured Interview Protocol 
 53 
 
Figure 18.  If-Then Drivers Diagram 
The researcher selected nine participants from different levels, backgrounds and 
functions within Naval aviation. The group consisted of active and retired military 
personnel who served as commanding officers, air wing commanders, type wing 
commodores, NAE personnel, professional maintenance leaders, or command master 
chiefs. As part of the institutional review board’s approval for human subject research, 
their identities are not revealed. The researcher selected this group in an effort to closely 
adhere to the recommendations given by Kaplan and Norton for building a balanced 
scorecard. Not only do the interviewees represent executive leadership, they also possess 
disparate perspectives and filled disparate roles within Naval aviation. The diversity in 
perspectives helped mitigate important omissions or oversights when selecting objectives 
or targets. The disparity of the respondents’ backgrounds and perspectives also facilitated 
an assessment of how well the strategic guidance of CNAF and the CNO aligned with the 
respondents’ views of success.  
The researcher conducted the structured interviews via telephone, face-to-face, 
and in one case e-mail. Interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees 
and subsequently transcribed for data analysis by the researcher and safeguarded by 
institutional review board procedures. 
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E. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data obtained from documentary sources served to set targets for measurements 
selected for the balanced scorecard. Directives and instructions provided explicit targets 
while award submissions and other reporting system entries had to be manipulated to 
formulate appropriate targets. Specific cases of those manipulations are discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
The researcher analyzed qualitative data by reviewing the interview transcripts 
and grouping data according to the interview question or topic. Common responses or 
themes among respondent replies formed patterns which the researcher could use to 
assess the alignment of priorities among stakeholders and identify viable scorecard 
objectives and measures. This type of analysis was intended to closely replicate what 
might happen in a balanced scorecard team meeting described by Kaplan and Norton 
(1996). 
F. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND ISSUES 
The structured interviews provided a wealth of information and data; but they 
were not absent of shortcomings. The researcher provided the questions to the 
interviewees via e-mail approximately one week prior to the interview. This was done to 
allow the respondents an opportunity to contemplate their perspectives on cause and 
effect relationships among the objectives and measures. A number of the interviewees did 
indeed take the time to reflect on the questions and formulate thoughtful answers ahead 
of the interview. However, their proactive intent was overcome by some confusion over 
terminology. Two of the respondents did not fully understand the term “performance 
requirement” in the context intended by the researcher. Another form of confusion, or 
perhaps distraction, resulted from the enclosed if-then drivers diagram. Instead of using 
the diagram as a template for a thought process, some of the respondents tended to focus 
on the specific example in the diagram. The diagram shows an objective of reduced 
maintenance man-hours along with suggested causal elements. Four of the interviewees 
focused on that specific objective and causal elements. Instead of stimulating discussion 
toward that kind of framework, they would argue the validity of the objective or the 
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causal elements in the diagram. In three cases, this resulted in a distraction from which 
the respondent could not be extracted resulting in little usable data for that portion of the 
interview. 
Despite the designed structure, five of the interviews strayed into a semi-
structured form with the interviewee entertaining several intriguing yet unrelated 
tangential trains of thought. While three returned on topic, two interviews were 
effectively derailed and ended without answering questions 12 through 15. While 
disappointing, one could argue that similar events might transpire during a balanced 
scorecard meeting among executives. 
G. SUMMARY 
The strategy and design of the research provided enough data to successfully 
answer questions necessary to apply the balanced scorecard to a strike fighter squadron. 
The research data also revealed important patterns in the perceptions of a disparate group 
of Naval aviation stakeholders. Those patterns, even without a scorecard, provide insight 
into how Naval aviation leaders might focus efforts to manage the fiscal challenges 
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IV. FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the findings and results from data collection and analysis 
relevant to the research strategy and necessary for the construction of a usable and 
appropriate balanced scorecard for a strike fighter squadron. The following sections 
integrate results and findings into the development of the scorecard while complying as 
closely as possible with Kaplan and Norton’s process. 
A. STRATEGIC LINKS 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) recommend beginning the process of creating a 
balanced scorecard by selecting the appropriate organizational unit and identifying 
linkages between the business unit and the top corporate level to ensure alignment of 
mission, vision, values, and strategy. The author chose to focus on a strike fighter 
squadron as the business unit and align its objectives with the strategic guidance issued 
by the CNO and CNAF.   
The exploratory aspect of this research focused on how various stakeholders 
within Naval aviation define a successful strike fighter squadron. This concept was vital 
to the construction of the balanced scorecard because it provided the means to identify 
links (or breaks) between the business unit and the top corporate level of the 
organization. A disparity of priorities or views of success within the ranks of Naval 
aviation would complicate the process of shaping behavior toward leadership’s goals. 
The congruency of attitudes regarding success in the interviews was striking. 
Without exception, each respondent began their description of success with one of 
various ways to describe combat effectiveness (e.g., warfighting ability, warrior ethos, 
combat performance). The remaining themes did not appear in the same order but were 
equally consistent. The respondents’ answers, when grouped by most prevalent themes, 
describe a successful strike fighter squadron as one which: 
• Excels in combat effectiveness (warfighting ability) 
• Demonstrates skillful flying in the carrier environment 
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• Takes care of its Sailors 
• Complies well with directives (e.g., orders, instructions, requirements) 
Compared to the tenets and guiding principles found in the CNO’s Sailing 
Directions (2012), one might conclude that his message translates well into stakeholders’ 
perceptions of success. In the author’s view, this finding is not likely to surprise anyone 
who has taken part in the Global War on Terror within the last twelve years. No one can 
dispute the immense efforts and focus raised by this generation to bring the Navy’s 
incredible power to bear upon the enemy. The primacy of the focus on effectiveness, 
however, can obscure the vision required for difficult fiscal decisions in the post-conflict 
environment.  
Recognizing the tenuous nature of maintaining a capable and ready force within a 
volatile fiscal environment, CNAF issued the Naval Aviation Enterprise Strategic 
Guidance (2013c). His guidance described budgetary shortfalls and included a gap 
closure strategy which directed a reduction in cost of the flying hour program across all 
type/model/series by ten percent. This aspect of strategy was not reflected in the remarks 
of any of the respondents. 
Every respondent acknowledged direct, negative impacts of budget shortfalls, 
sequestration, and the government shutdown; however, none of them believed that 
squadrons are incentivized to reduce their operating costs. Once again, it is unlikely that 
anyone who has been a part of a strike fighter squadron in the past twelve years will be 
surprised by this finding. Individuals may even argue that the system is not designed for a 
squadron to focus on such endeavors. This finding and its divergence from CNAF’s 
strategy, is the primary driver for the importance and relevance of this thesis. The 
implications and interaction of this finding and the balanced scorecard are addressed in 
Chapter Five. 
B. PERSPECTIVES 
After formulating strategy, Kaplan and Norton (1996) advised the next step is to 
select objectives within the four perspectives which support the strategy, or in this case, 
the overall squadron objective. This was where Kaplan and Norton’s framework needed 
 59 
to be adjusted to properly fit a strike fighter squadron. The financial, customer, internal 
business processes, and learning and growth perspectives used in civilian business do not 
easily translate to a military unit. Figure 19 shows the perspectives and objectives 
integrated in a strategy map for a strike fighter squadron. The strategy map is useful for 
visualizing the overall strategy, the cascading effect of objectives, and the interactions 
among the drivers (Kaplan & Norton, 2004). The following sections discuss how the 
perspectives were adjusted to properly fit a strike fighter squadron’s structure and value 
proposition. 
 
Figure 19.  Squadron Strategy Map 
The adjusted perspectives must be compared to criteria recommended by Kaplan 
and Norton (1996). Referencing Figure 19, the perspectives represent the structure of the 
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organization. For the strike fighter squadron, the perspectives are divided among the 
commanding officer and the squadron’s major departments: operations, maintenance, and 
administrative. The nature of departments’ contributions to the squadron’s value 
proposition facilitate a cascading effect of objectives and measures from one perspective 
to the next. At the foundation of the new framework, the administrative department 
focuses on developing and caring for personnel. Properly supported, those personnel set 
to the task of preparing and maintaining the resources required to create value. With 
resources at the ready, the operations department executes the training plan to create 
readiness (combat effectiveness) from available resources. At the top of the framework, 
the commanding officer holds the responsibility for the ultimate outcome of the 
cascading efforts. This framework follows Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) guidance of 
having perspectives that follow the structure of the organization, represent the value 
proposition, and possess relationships that allow objectives to cascade throughout the 
organization. 
As its name implies, the financial perspective of a civilian corporate balanced 
scorecard focuses on concepts such as profitability, sales growth, return on assets, or 
return on equity. However, readiness, rather than financial performance, is the ultimate 
goal of a strike fighter squadron. Regardless, cost control is becoming increasingly 
important as a component of readiness. The CNO and CNAF use the term “cost-wise 
readiness.”  These two elements (cost and readiness) directly reflect the achievement of 
the overall squadron objective and therefore should fall under the purview of the 
commanding officer. Because of the differences between military units and civilian 
business, the financial perspective has a different desired outcome. For those reasons, the 
author adjusted the financial perspective to become the commander’s perspective. The 
commander’s perspective can be seen at the top of Figure 19. 
The customer perspective is not as easily adapted. To Kaplan and Norton, the 
customer perspective contains objectives relating to how the customers interact with the 
company. For example, the customer perspective might include objectives relating to 
customer retention, new customer accounts, or customer satisfaction. Who then is the 
customer of a strike fighter squadron?  Kaplan and Norton (2004) write extensively about 
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the value proposition, or the defining characteristics resulting from the company’s 
operations that set it apart from its competitors or other industries. One can easily argue 
that a strike fighter squadron produces combat effectiveness for combatant commanders. 
The combat effectiveness of a strike fighter squadron cannot easily be substituted by 
other units. The value proposition therefore is the combat effectiveness provided by the 
specific capabilities of a strike fighter squadron. Readiness can be thought of as a 
prediction of the combat effectiveness of a strike fighter squadron. Specifically, readiness 
is defined as the “ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commander to 
execute assigned missions, and derived from the ability of each unit to conduct the 
mission(s) for which it was designed” (CJCS, 2010 p. 2). Readiness is of great value to 
combatant commanders and that value is created through the aviation training carried out 
by the operations department of a squadron. Objectives relating to the creation of value 
for the customer will be centered upon the squadron’s ability to hone its warfighting 
capabilities. Based upon that, the author chose to change the customer perspective to the 
operational perspective. The operational perspective lies just beneath the commander’s 
perspective in Figure 19. 
No aviation training can be had without appropriate resources and equipment. The 
responsibility to manage and maintain resources rests with a squadron’s maintenance 
department. With the exception of coordinating supplies and spare parts, the activities of 
the maintenance department are generally internal in nature. These characteristics 
translate well to Kaplan and Norton’s internal processes perspective. While no 
adjustment to this perspective is needed, all of the objectives within this perspective 
concern maintenance processes and training. The internal processes perspective sits 
beneath the operational perspective in Figure 19; accomplishing all the objectives within 
the internal processes perspective enables the operations department to create combat 
readiness. 
The final perspective of learning and growth contains objectives which relate to 
people, systems, and organizational procedures that ensure long-term improvement and 
growth Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Just as no training can be had without resources and 
equipment, no maintenance can be completed without personnel. Specific attention must 
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be paid to the needs of those on whom all operations depend. Early and often in an 
officer’s career, he or she is instructed to, “Take care of your Sailors.”  It is widely 
recognized that without a sincere commitment to those they lead, leaders will never gain 
a significant following. It is in this spirit that the learning and growth perspective 
approaches personnel in a strike fighter squadron. Because the central focus of this 
perspective is personnel, the author chose to rename the learning and growth perspective 
as the personnel perspective. Objectives within the personnel perspective will focus on 
taking care of Sailors. People are the foundation of any organization which is why the 
personnel perspective sits at the bottom of the strategy map in Figure 19. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
Data analysis of the interviews, incorporating CNAF’s mission, and the author’s 
experience within the strike fighter community yielded the following objectives within 
each perspective: 
• Commander’s Perspective 
• Produce the required readiness at a reduced cost 
• Operational Perspective 
• Warfighting Focus 
• Professional Carrier Operations 
• Conservation 
• Internal Process Perspective 
• Maintenance Excellence 
• Superb Training 
• Conservation 
• Personnel Perspective 
• Healthy Sailors 
• Motivated Sailors 
• Focused Sailors 
The following sections describe how each objective was selected. Figures 19 and 
20 show how the objectives are organized within the balanced scorecard. 
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Strategic guidance, the choices made regarding the scope of the scorecard, and the 
findings of the interviews led the researcher to define the overall squadron objective as: 
produce the required readiness at a reduced cost. Required readiness from a squadron’s 
perspective is calculated depending on its location within the FRTP profile, which is 
assigned by U.S. Fleet Forces Command. While individual aviators might argue that 
more readiness is always better, that is not always the case. A squadron that attains a 
higher level of readiness than its funding provides may consume more than its intended 
share of scarce resources. As a result, another squadron may be deprived of reaching its 
required level of readiness. The “right readiness” described in CNAF’s mission statement 
speaks to that concept and therefore urges squadrons to adhere to their assigned profile. 
Asking respondents their thoughts on objectives for squadrons to achieve success 
resulted in answers that mirrored their descriptions of successful squadrons. For the 
operational perspective, every respondent listed warfighting focus and professional 
carrier operations. A central theme among interviews (~70 percent) regarding 
maintenance (internal process perspective), was an emphasis on “by the book 
maintenance” and quality training.  “By the book maintenance” can be viewed as 
maintenance excellence, or the department’s ability to adhere to the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Program (NAMP, COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B) and CNAF’s 
material readiness standards. Maintenance training might normally be included in the 
learning and growth perspective, but the author chose to include maintenance training in 
the internal process perspective because it is the primary driver of excellence within a 
maintenance department. Training is critical because personnel turnover in a military unit 
is constant by design. A squadron will replace approximately one third of its personnel 
every year. With the exception of a few billets, the personnel within a squadron will be 
completely different after a three-year period. Taking care of the Sailors was another 
dominant theme during the interviews. Taking care of one’s Sailors means to demonstrate 
a sincere commitment to their goals and well-being. Providing the right guidance and 
policy to ensure a positive work environment, a robust program to facilitate career 
aspirations, and a healthy workforce is the foundation upon which all is accomplished 
within a squadron. 
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The author chose the objectives of conservation because none of the respondents 
included cost reduction when discussing success. The interview data indicated that 
squadron leaders are not engaging in discussions about cost reduction. When asked, every 
respondent agreed that squadrons should be incentivized to reduce their costs. Only three 
of the respondents had specific ideas to accomplish that. Four of the respondents asserted 
that the best way to reduce maintenance related costs was to ensure a high number of 
well-trained technicians who strictly adhere to NAMP procedures. Better training and 
discipline leads to fewer costly mistakes. Of the six respondents who were aviators, all 
agreed that operations could be adjusted in some cases to reduce fuel consumption, but 
warned that some techniques would not be appropriate in every situation. 
Only two respondents mentioned safety as important objectives for successful 
squadrons. Four of the respondents considered safety to be a byproduct of 
professionalism. From their perspective, safety is an integral part of the objectives of 
professional carrier operations, warfighting focus, and maintenance excellence; 
Attributable mishaps are indicative of unprofessionalism and hence an unsuccessful 
squadron. The other three respondents either did not discuss safety at all or mentioned it 
briefly as part of another objective as an implied condition. 
D. DRIVERS AND MEASURES 
The author selected measures based upon data gathered during structured 
interviews. The interview respondents were presented with a list of measures used in the 
Battle “E” award. Respondents indicated which measures they felt contributed most to 
success and which contributed the least. The competitive timeframe of the Battle “E” is 
one year, so many of the chosen measures needed to be modified to present timely data 
useful for a balanced scorecard. Additionally, a number of the measures needed to be 
modified because they were not precisely connected to the desired results or they were 
not under the squadron’s control. Measures not derived from interview data were selected 
using the author’s experience within the strike fighter community and knowledge of the 
balanced scorecard. The author chose measures based upon simple criteria. The measures  
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were required to be easily tracked, fully controllable by the squadron, and have a direct, 
causal link to the objectives. A general overview of the measures within each perspective 
is depicted in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.  Strike Fighter Balanced Scorecard Framework 
The following sections describe each measure and the rationale behind its inclusion 
within the balanced scorecard. 
1. Commander’s Perspective: Objectives–Required Readiness at 
Reduced Cost 
Two measures in the commander’s perspective indicate progress toward 
achieving the required readiness at reduced cost: training readiness and cost performance 
index. These measures ensure the commander maintains awareness to the squadron’s 
readiness level and the targeted total cost per hour (comprised of fuel, aviation fleet 
maintenance, and aviation depot level repairs). A failure to meet targets in either of these 
measures would prompt the commander to investigate their various elements to identify 
root causes.  
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 Training Readiness  a.
Training readiness compares the actual reported readiness of the squadron 
against the average training readiness (ATR) requirement based upon the squadron’s 
position in the FRTP. This measure is easily calculated by the officer in charge of 
tracking training and readiness through a “current readiness report” generated from the 
Sierra Hotel Advanced Readiness Program. Once the report is generated, the officer must 
calculate a training figure of merit (TFOM) for each Navy tactical task (NTA). The 
current readiness report report gives a performance factor and experience factor for each 
NTA. The officer would multiply the performance factor by the experience factor and 
divide by 100 to get the NTA’s TFOM. Taking the average of all the TFOMs would yield 
the final figure to compare with the ATR for the given readiness month (R+Month). The 
readiness standards instruction (CNAF, 2012b) lists the ATRs for each R+Month and 
provides thresholds for green, red, and yellow color coding. 
 Cost Performance Index  b.
Cost performance index can be derived from the aviation financial 
analysis tool (AFAST) user module. The AFAST user module displays the actual costs 
for the squadron for fuel, aviation fleet maintenance, and aviation depot level repairs and 
compares them against the “should cost” figures. The “should cost” is actual flight hours 
executed, multiplied by the budgeted cost per hour as calculated in the OP-20 funding 
document (CNAF N422, 2003). Dividing the “should cost” figure by the actual cost per 
hour yields the cost performance index. Not meeting the total cost target for this measure 
would prompt the commander to investigate its different components to determine causal 
factors. Even though AFAST costs are adjusted for differences in captured costs and 
executed financial costs reported in the aviation cost evaluation system (ACES), they are 
not considered a fully burdened cost (CNAF N422, 2003). Using AFAST data, which 
only include aviation depot level repairable, aviation fleet maintenance, and fuel costs, is 
desirable because the measures used by the squadron need only be those controllable by 
the squadron. 
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2. Operational Perspective: Objectives–Warfighting Focus, Professional 
Carrier Operations, Conservation 
 Training Efficiency  a.
Training efficiency is a vital measurement that should shape critical 
behaviors within the squadron. Training efficiency measures the rate of mission 
accomplishment, but in a slightly different way than aviators may be familiar. Training 
efficiency counts how many missions were flown when the designated crew received the 
intended training with an appropriately configured and equipped jet on a suitable training 
range with the correct ordnance; that number is then divided by the total number of 
missions planned for that month. This measure would not include those missions that did 
not launch for reasons beyond the control of the squadron (e.g., weather, base closure). 
The training efficiency measure supports teamwork and coordination among different 
departments within the squadron. A majority of the respondents discussed the importance 
of communication among the different departments of the squadron. The operations and 
maintenance departments require effective communication and coordination to 
successfully satisfy all five requirements of the measure on a regular basis. Interview data 
revealed that a number of squadrons hold weekly maintenance-ops meetings and 
planning boards for training to facilitate coordination and communication between the 
maintenance and operations departments, but some do not. The training efficiency 
measure would force close coordination and cooperation among maintenance, operations, 
and the ordnance officer. Additionally, since the denominator is planned missions, critical 
thought must be given to a spare jet game plan in the event a maintenance discrepancy 
precludes launching an aircraft. 
 Simulator Utilization  b.
Simulator utilization changed very little in the strike fighter community 
from the 1970s through 2002 (Schank, Thie, Graf, Beel, & Sollinger, 2002). Three of the 
respondents, who were current aviators, asserted that simulator fidelity has improved 
dramatically in recent years, but it can never fully replicate all of the value aircrew get 
from actually flying a jet. Despite that, the respondents also acknowledged that practicing 
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certain tasks in a simulator prior to actual flight, leads to fewer mistakes and a higher 
quality of training. The simulator utilization measure would count the number of strike 
fighter weapons and tactics (SFWT) syllabus flights that were preceded by a simulator 
event divided by the total number of SFWT flights flown that month. The denominator 
would include only those flights for which a practice simulator is listed within the 
syllabus. Interview data revealed that fleet squadrons are given only 11 percent of the 
monthly capacity of the simulators in Lemoore. As a result, most simulator events in the 
SFWT syllabus are optional. The simulator utilization measure should incentivize greater 
effort to use the simulators and lead to greater training efficiencies. 
 SFWT Accomplishment  c.
Respondents confirmed that an important part of furthering warfighting 
focus within a squadron is the advancement of the skill and qualifications of aircrew. 
There are five levels of the SFWT program with levels two, three, and four normally 
being achieved while in a fleet squadron (CSFWP, 2010). Managing the progression of 
aircrew through their syllabi can be challenging, specifically in squadrons which employ 
the two-seat model (FA-18F) with twice the number of aircrew. There is no defined 
standard for the time it should take an aviator to complete the various levels (CSFWP, 
2010). Interview data showed some squadrons set goals while others do not. The SFWT 
accomplishment measure would count how many aircrew in a SFWT syllabus are on 
schedule and divide that by the total number of aircrew in the SFWT program. This 
measure would allow a squadron to choose its own schedule and track their progress in 
adhering to it. Shortfalls in this ratio would give the commander warning and push 
him/her to investigate possible causes (e.g., a lack of resources, a lack of planning, or 
repeated re-flies by underperforming aircrew). 
 Air-to-Air Effectiveness d.
Encouraging fighter aircrew to take air-to-air training seriously is not a 
difficult task. Air-to-air missions are challenging, dynamic, and can be immensely 
enjoyable for aircrew. Measuring the effectiveness of that training is a distinct challenge. 
One method would be through the ratio of valid air-to-air weapons employed to the total 
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number of air-to-air weapon employment attempts (simulated). The act of properly 
employing an air-to-air weapon can be difficult, especially when facing fourth generation 
adversaries in a dynamic and complex tactical situation while utilizing a data-link 
network. The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) developed criteria for the 
valid employment of each air-to-air weapon (NSAWC, 2011). The criteria puts an 
employment into one of three categories: valid, invalid, and “unassessable.” A high ratio 
of valid shots to total shots taken, signals a well disciplined and knowledgeable cadre of 
warfighters. 
 Air-to-Ground Effectiveness e.
In the same manner of measuring air-to-air effectiveness, NSAWC valid 
delivery criteria can be used to measure the effectiveness of air-to-surface employment. 
In addition to the criteria set forth by NSAWC for valid air-to-surface deliveries, time-on-
target adherence, proper weapon function, and circular error of probability (CEP, a 
measure of delivery accuracy) will be included in evaluating the delivery. While an 
NSAWC instructor might argue those things should already be taken into account, fleet 
aircrew may not always consider each of those components in practice. Proper weapon 
function demands quality from the ordnance work center when actual ordnance is carried. 
In training scenarios when ordnance is simulated, aircrew would assume the weapons 
functioned properly and accurately. 
 Boarding Rate  f.
To gauge professionalism when flying in the carrier environment, two 
traditional measures have been used: boarding rate and landing grades. Deficiencies in 
either of these measures might signal a lack of focus, training, or both. Boarding rate is 
simply the ratio of carrier arrested landings to landing attempts (not including wave-offs 
outside the pilot’s control). The boarding rate measure is important because failure to 
land on the first attempt increases the time and fuel required for the recovery of aircraft. 
Not only wasteful, such increases can jeopardize survival during combat when time and 
resources may be scarce as a result of enemy action. 
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 Landing Grades  g.
Each time a pilot makes an approach to a carrier, his/her pass is graded by 
a Landing Signal Officer for the purposes of trend analysis (NAVAIR, 2013). Landing 
Signal Officers’ primary responsibility is to communicate with pilots during the terminal 
phase of landing to ensure the safe and expeditious recovery of aircraft (NAVAIR, 2013). 
Landing Signal Officers are required to periodically brief pilots about trends that 
developed in their landing technique (NAVAIR, 2013). Landing Signal Officers utilize a 
four point grading scale and a series of coded comments for each landing to facilitate 
trends analysis using the Automated Performance Assessment and Readiness Training 
System (NAVAIR, 2009). As a wing-qualified Landing Signal Officer in an operational 
strike fighter squadron and a training-qualified Landing Signal Officer in a fleet 
replacement squadron, the author experienced the topic of landing grades to become 
polarizing among aviators. A number of aviators may argue against the emphasis on 
grades, but others might argue that grades lead to safety and focus by forcing a pilot to 
protect his reputation via his grade point average. Landing Signal Officers evaluate and 
grade each pilot’s pass using criteria standardized through supervised on-the-job training 
and formal ground training at the Landing Signal Officer School in Oceana, Virginia 
(NAVAIR, 2013). Despite the effort to standardize, grading and evaluation criteria can be 
applied slightly differently between air wings. Because of the variation in grading from 
one air wing to the next, the Battle “E” award scoring process, described in Chapter One, 
indexes a squadron’s grades against other squadrons within the same air wing (CSFWP, 
2012). For the purposes of this balanced scorecard, the landing grades measure would be 
a relationship of the squadron’s landing grade point average versus the air wing grade 
point average. Above average landing grades should signal a healthy amount of skill, 
focus, and training without over emphasizing numerical competition.  
 Operational Safety Assessment h.
The effectiveness of a safety program is extremely difficult to measure 
(Nieva & Sorra, 2003). Simply counting the number of mishaps and assigning a score 
defeats the purpose of a safety program, which is to prevent mishaps. One way to 
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measure the nature of a safety program would be to use a qualitative assessment by the 
commanding officer or the command’s safety officer. A squadron’s safety culture can be 
described by elements such as individual attitudes regarding safety, the utilization of 
operational risk management, and collective knowledge of emergency procedures and 
systems. After lengthy observation, a commanding officer could rate the squadron’s 
safety culture on a scale of one to five. A score of one would represent a total disregard 
for safety and risk management; a five would represent a zealous quest for safety. A 
reasonable target would be a score of three which might represent a squadron that utilizes 
reasonable situational emergency training, legitimate monthly immediate action exams, 
and practices thoughtful operational risk management on a routine basis. Despite a lack 
of quantitative measurement, the process of thoughtful reflection upon the safety culture 
of the squadron might invite a higher level of awareness leading to a more proactive 
safety program. 
 Gallons Per Hour  i.
Based on the cost structure of a strike fighter squadron presented in 
Chapter One, one might argue the greatest impact the operations department can have on 
the cost of readiness is through fuel consumption. Two of the respondents suggested 
selecting a measure that would calculate the gallons of fuel per unit of readiness; 
however, there are various problems with such a measure. First, a unit of readiness is 
difficult to define. Aircrew must complete a variety of tasks within specified time periods 
to become a “skilled crew” in each capability area (NTA). The tasks which contribute to 
each NTA can be mixed and matched in different combinations to achieve “skilled” 
status (CSFWP, 2013). To measure gallons per task would encourage aircrew to complete 
as many tasks as possible per flight or to fly those missions which have the highest 
number of tasks associated with them. Either case is not necessarily what is intended. 
Moreover, some flights are not flown for the sole purpose of readiness. Some flights are 
flown for the advancement of aircrew qualification and some are flown in support of 
other units’ training. Naval aircraft are often used to facilitate the training of Joint 
terminal air controllers and to act as oppositional forces for various military exercises. 
Some readiness is gained through that, but in those cases readiness may not be the focus. 
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Using gallons per readiness task as a measure would also fail to address the fact that not 
all crews need to be skilled in all NTAs (CSFWP, 2013). Additionally, the measure is so 
obscure that it might be difficult to analyze trends. If at the end of the month, it is found 
that the squadron has missed the target for gallons per task, what might be the cause?  
What would be the corrective action?  It is for these reasons the author did not choose 
gallons per task. 
The author chose gallons per hour because it is a measure that is easy to 
understand, analyze, and record. Gallons per hour, however, has a gamesmanship element 
that must be considered. If gallons per hour is the measure, then aircrew might be 
encouraged to maximize their flight time and minimize their fuel burn rate on each 
mission. This is desirable in very few cases. Not using afterburner during a defensive 
counter air mission because one wants to draw out the flight time as long as possible 
would likely fail to meet the training objectives and measures of performance for that 
mission (CSFWP, 2013). Managers can mitigate gamesmanship by having other 
measures which counteract potential negative behaviors. For example, the gallons per 
hour measure is countered by air-to-surface effectiveness, air-to-air effectiveness, and 
training efficiency. Based upon the training objectives and measures of performance 
listed in the wing training manual (CSFWP, 2013), it would be implausible to remain 
effective and accomplish intended training for most missions by flying a fuel conserving 
profile for the entire flight. There are actions, however, that can be taken to save fuel. For 
instance, reducing the drag by changing the configuration of the aircraft can extend flight 
time without sacrificing training. Some flights may be conducted without external fuel 
tanks (short missions at nearby ranges). Ground operations can be minimized to reduce 
fuel consumption. Not all situations will warrant such action but there are many ways 
squadrons can reduce their fuel consumption. One might argue that thinking in terms of 
gallons per hour is the most practical way to influence aircrew behavior toward 
conservation. 
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3. Internal Processes Perspective: Objectives–Maintenance Excellence, 
Superb Training, Conservation 
 Aircraft Availability  a.
According to the interviews, aircraft availability is one of the most highly 
scrutinized maintenance measures. It is measured using a concept known as ready for 
tasking (RFT). An aircraft ready for tasking is one which is not only capable of flight but 
also has an appropriate complement of usable combat systems to carry out the squadron’s 
NTAs (CNAF, 2012b). The readiness standards instruction (CNAF, 2012b) lists the RFT 
requirements for squadrons in each R+Month throughout FRTP. In this balanced 
scorecard, meeting RFT would indicate successful outcomes of an excellent maintenance 
department. Not meeting RFT requirements would not necessarily negate the 
maintenance department’s excellence. Interviews revealed a host of reasons that might 
lead to a squadron not meeting RFT requirements. For instance, one air wing commander 
interviewed specifically listed spare parts availability, a lack of qualified personnel, and 
several aircraft sent to a maintenance depot or on loan to NSAWC as reasons for one of 
his squadrons only having one out of twelve aircraft available to fly. In a normal FRTP 
cycle, not meeting RFT would give a commander cause to investigate the management of 
his maintenance department. 
The Quality Assurance (QA) division can have influence over a maintenance 
department’s level of excellence if properly empowered. The objectives of the QA 
division outlined in the NAMP, Chapter 7.1.1are: 
• Improve the quality, uniformity, and reliability of the total maintenance 
effort. 
• Improve the work environment, tools, and equipment used in the 
maintenance effort. 
• Eliminate unnecessary man-hour and dollar expenditures. 
• Improve training, work habits, and procedures of maintenance personnel. 
• Increase the excellence and value of reports and correspondence 
originated by maintenance personnel. 
• Effectively disseminate technical information. 
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• Establish realistic material and equipment requirements in support of the 
maintenance effort. 
• Support the Naval aviation maintenance discrepancy reporting program 
(NAMDRP). 
• Support the foreign object damage (FOD) prevention program. 
The strike fighter balanced scorecard utilizes three QA related measures to signal 
progress in achieving maintenance excellence: expired audits, repeat discrepancies, and 
drills.   
 Late QA Audits  b.
An important part of achieving QA’s objectives is the QA audit program. 
QA division personnel conduct audits of work centers and maintenance programs on a 
scheduled and unscheduled basis throughout a given year. The audits are used to identify, 
investigate, and correct deficiencies within the maintenance department (CNAF, 2013b). 
The Quality Assurance Supervisor and Quality Assurance Officer are responsible for the 
management of the QA division and its audit program (CNAF, 2013b). Setting a schedule 
for program and work center audits in compliance with the NAMP and then adhering to 
that schedule, demonstrates a dedication to the importance of the audit program. The late 
QA audits measure for this balanced scorecard would take the number of late audits 
divided by the total number of audits for the previous six months. A high percentage of 
late audits would signal an impending backlog of audits and a possible degrade in their 
quality as personnel rush to catch up. High quality audits are essential to ensuring work 
center and program compliance with the NAMP along with organizational learning 
(CNAF, 2013b). 
 Repeat Discrepancies  c.
Closely related to the late QA audit measure is the repeat discrepancy 
measure. Instead of measuring the QA division’s commitment to the QA audit program, 
repeat discrepancies measures the commitment of the work center or program to improve 
its performance. The measure identifies the percentage of discrepancies from the most 
recent audits that are repeated from the previous audit. This measure would be tracked for 
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each program and work center audit and aggregated over the previous six month period 
for the balanced scorecard. The six-month period would ensure that an audit of every 
work center and program would be included in the percentage. A high percentage of 
repeat discrepancies would indicate a lack of learning and improvement which could 
stem from work center or program mismanagement or from poor assistance and feedback 
from the QA division. 
 Drills d.
The final QA related measure concerns program and work center drills. 
Drills are a key part of preparing for two major maintenance inspections, the 
Maintenance Program Assist conducted by the type wing and the Aviation Maintenance 
Inspection conducted by CNAF inspectors (CSFWP, 2009; CNAF 2013b). Both 
inspections occur once per FRTP cycle or 24 months (CSFWP, 2009; CNAF 2013b). 
Both inspections test a squadron’s maintenance department on how well it adheres to 
policies within the NAMP. Part of the inspection process includes drills, testing the 
coordinated reaction of maintenance personnel to a variety of emergent situations 
(CNAF, 2013b). Interview respondents indicated some squadrons may delay their 
preparation for these inspections and end up “cramming” their efforts to get ready a few 
months out. Such behavior often negatively impacts flight operations and morale. The 
intent of the inspection process is to compel squadrons to operate each day as if they were 
preparing for an inspection, “safely and efficiently perform its mission as defined by 
applicable directives” (CNAF, 2013b, ch. 2, p. 2–3). The QA division is often responsible 
for coordinating the drills and inspection preparation because of its other responsibilities 
outlined in the NAMP. Having a measure that compares the efforts to prepare for 
inspection against a monthly preparation plan encourages behavior that should ultimately 
lead to a successful inspection cycle. A coordinated and concentrated effort to prepare for 
inspection throughout the year is likely to enhance the performance level of work center 
supervisors and program managers. 
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 Maintenance Personnel Readiness Fit e.
A new measure put in use by strike fighter type wing commanders is one 
called maintenance personnel readiness (MPR) (CNAF, 2013e). This measure expands 
upon older measures such as qualified proficient technician fit (QPT fit) and Navy 
Enlisted Classification fit (NEC fit) (CSFWP, 2012). QPT fit measured how many 
maintenance personnel in each work center held the expected qualification level 
(apprentice, journeyman, master) based on their rank (CSFWP, 2012). While important, 
QPT fit fails to capture other qualifications outside the QPT program. NEC fit measures 
how many personnel within a squadron hold a specific career qualification (NEC) against 
an expected standard (CNAP, 2010). One interview respondent pointed out the 
shortcomings of NEC fit. He stated that it does not recognize that some Sailors with 
certain NEC codes may not be able to perform the work described by their NEC because 
of their work center assignment. For example, a Sailor who holds an NEC which qualifies 
him to work on aerial refueling stores might be a supervisor for an unrelated work center. 
Putting that Sailor into a billet to specifically work on aerial refueling stores would 
negatively impact his career and create a gap in a supervisory role in his original work 
center. So while the squadron might appear to have enough personnel to work on aerial 
refueling stores, the reality is they are one short. Additionally, the respondent asserted 
that new personnel arriving to the squadron sometimes might not have an NEC they were 
expected to have based upon the billet they were expected to fill. Squadrons have little 
control over who gets sent to their squadron and what NECs they hold. For the reasons 
indicated by the respondent, NEC fit is not a suitable measure for how well a squadron 
manages its maintenance training. MPR attempts to correct for these shortcomings by 
including QPT along with a variety of other critical qualifications within the maintenance 
department. MPR does not include NEC qualifications but it does take into account who 
can actually fill the duties of the other critical qualifications (CNAF, 2013e). For the 
strike fighter balanced scorecard, MPR fit is the average percentage of appropriately 
filled qualifications. A high MPR illustrates a maintenance department that has an 
adequate number of qualified personnel to complete required maintenance tasks in a two-
shift work day.   
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 Maintenance Safety Assessment f.
The safety culture within a maintenance department is as important as in 
the operations department but it is of a different nature because the maintenance 
department focuses on compliance with maintenance related safety regulations listed in 
the Navy safety and occupational health program manual (OPNAVINST 5100.23G) and 
the NAMP. The maintenance safety culture measure was configured similarly to the 
operational safety assessment using a qualitative assessment by the commander or an 
officer of his choosing (e.g., Safety Officer, Quality Assurance Officer, Assistant 
Maintenance Officer). The assessment would be made along the same five point scale but 
would focus on aspects of safety applicable to the maintenance department. 
 CPI Training Events g.
The structured interviews revealed that squadrons do not routinely practice 
or train to the concepts of continuous process improvement or AIRSpeed managed by the 
Naval Aviation Enterprise and directed by DODI 5010.43. According to the interviews, 
much of the training relating to AIRSpeed is lengthy, formalized, and often not accessible 
to fleet squadron personnel. However, the basic levels of AIRSpeed and CPI training 
might be helpful in creating a culture of process improvement and efficiency within both 
the operations and maintenance departments. Arguably, the creative ideas of junior 
personnel will lead to process improvement. However, junior personnel must first be 
equipped with the concepts and encouraged by leaders to question old ways of doing 
business. For the strike fighter balanced scorecard, the measure would simply be how 
many AIRSpeed, CPI, or NAE “boots on ground” (CPI site visit projects) training events 
the squadron participated in during the month. This leading measure should set the tone 
for an environment of improvement and efficiency. 
4. Personnel Perspective: Objectives–Healthy, Motivated, and Focused 
Sailors 
 Heath Promotion Plan a.
The health promotion program (CNAFR, 2009) is a system of education 
and interventions focusing on health, social, economic, and environmental issues to 
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encourage healthy lifestyles and increase organizational and individual readiness. 
Squadrons’ health promotion programs are evaluated each year and those meeting 
specific criteria will win an award called the Blue “M” (CNAFR, 2009). Crafting a robust 
health promotion program and establishing a plan of action to achieve the goals not just 
to win the Blue “M” but to truly enhance the physical wellbeing of Sailors is likely to 
contribute to their ability to accomplish the mission. The measure for this balanced 
scorecard would be the number of goals reached or events completed (e.g., physical 
readiness test pass rate, tobacco cessation, dietary training) for that particular month 
divided by the number of goals and events planned for that month as dictated by the 
squadron’s health promotion program instruction. 
 Late Career Development Boards b.
Part of maintaining a motivated workforce is through demonstrating a 
sincere commitment to every Sailor’s career aspirations. Two measures which are direct 
indications of a squadron’s commitment are career development boards (CDB) and a 
advancement exam preparation program. CDBs are meetings with each Sailor, the 
Command Career Counselor, the Command Master Chief, and a supervisor and/or 
mentor (OPNAV, 2012). The purpose of the board is to review the career progress of the 
Sailor, his/her service record, and future steps needed to reach the Sailor’s goals. CDBs 
are held within 30 days of a Sailor reporting to the squadron, the six month point, the 12 
month point, and then every 12 months thereafter (OPNAV, 2012). Keeping the program 
on schedule ensures that Sailors are getting the information they need to make sound 
career decisions. This balanced scorecard measure would be the number of late CDBs 
divided by the total number of boards required that month. A low percentage of late 
CDBs would represent that the program is receiving the required attention to keep it 
relevant and effective. 
 Advancement Exam Pass Rate c.
Sailors in the paygrade of E-4 through E-7 must pass a navy-wide 
advancement exam to be eligible for advancement in rate. (BUPERS, 2007). 
Advancement exams for E4 through E-6 are held twice a year in September and March, 
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for E-7s they are held in January (BUPERS, 2007). An advancement exam preparation 
program which integrates preparation efforts into the workweek instead of forcing Sailors 
to study off-duty is one way to demonstrate a squadron’s commitment to Sailors’ success. 
The measure for the strike fighter balanced scorecard would be the number of those who 
passed the test divided by the number of those who took the test for the most recent exam 
cycle. While this measure would not reflect monthly progress, it would provide an 
indication of overall program health. 
 Positive Environment d.
The final measure facilitating a focused workforce is to maintain a 
positive environment. Hostile work environments, excessive workload, drug and alcohol 
problems, discrimination, and sexual harassment are all distractions which can keep 
Sailors from doing their best. This measure would be a qualitative measure collected 
from representatives of various groups within the squadron (i.e., junior officers, chiefs, 
first class petty officers, and junior enlisted). One representative from each group would 
rate the morale of their group on a scale of one to five. A score of one would indicate 
conditions so poor that almost all members of that group hold deep animosity toward the 
squadron. A score of five would mean that every member of the group is happy with 
conditions, task loading, and group cohesion. A target score of three would be an 
appropriate target where a majority of members in the group are satisfied with working 
conditions, workload, and generally feel valued by the command. Measuring in this way 
provides timely feedback to command leadership, protects the anonymity of 
complainants, and provides a regular avenue of communication to leadership from the 
lower ranks. 
E. TARGETS AND WEIGHTS 
Four of the respondents, who were or had recently been in operational positions, 
expressed concern about the establishment of targets and the use of the scorecard as a 
tool to compare squadrons. They said their concerns were based on the fact that 
squadrons operate in extremely variable environments. Even though the measures and 
targets might be normalized for a squadron’s position within the FRTP profile, external 
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forces might prohibit a squadron from being able to meet its requirements. For example, 
because of the government shutdown in October, 2013, the fleet readiness center in San 
Diego fell behind in its depot level repair work. This resulted in aircraft not being 
returned to the fleet on schedule; combined with requirements to lend aircraft to NSAWC 
or other agencies, some squadrons simply did not have enough aircraft to conduct even 
the most basic training. Such a situation would look fairly dire on the balanced scorecard. 
For that reason, the respondents agreed that the balanced scorecard should be a tool that 
remains at the squadron level. This way the commanding officer can change the targets 
based upon the squadron’s situation. The commander would not change the objectives 
but rather he would take into account the means available to meet the ends. Take for 
example the squadron unable to conduct training as a result of too few jets. Once the 
situation gets resolved, the squadron will have to set to the task of retraining its aircrew. 
Because of the lapse, it is not likely the commanding officer would reasonably expect a 
weapons efficiency score of 90 percent. It is in this way that the commanding officer 
could adjust the targets based upon the context in which the squadron finds itself. 
Initial targets selected for this balanced scorecard were based upon documentary 
evidence of training requirements or historical values. CNAF’s strategic guidance for the 
NAE set the target for CPI at 1.1 (CNAF, 2013c). Due to variation among individual 
scores, the author chose to use the average scores from the 2012 battle “E” award 
submissions from FA-18E/F squadrons of strike fighter wing, Pacific for the measures of 
boarding rate and advancement exam pass rate. Commanding officers would likely wish 
to set their own targets for boarding rate and advancement exam pass rate based upon 
their particular squadron’s situation. The readiness standards instruction (CNAF, 2012b) 
provides targets for training readiness and aircraft availability. Respondents reported a 
historical trend of air-to-surface effectiveness of approximately 80 percent. The author 
chose a target for air-to-surface effectiveness of 90, because three respondents stated their 
dissatisfaction with the historical trend. The author set the remaining targets based upon 
interview discussions and his experience within the strike fighter community. 
The author assigned weights to the measures based upon common themes of 
importance within the interviews and the strategic guidance issued by the CNO and 
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CNAF. The weights for each measure are reported in Figure 20. The weights range in 
magnitude from three to seven percent. The measures relating to objectives identified in 
interviews as most important were give weights of seven: training readiness, training 
efficiency, aircraft availability, and MPR fit. SFWT accomplishment and air-to-surface 
effectiveness were assigned weights of six percent because, while subordinate to those at 
seven percent, they still require much attention to ensure success. Cost performance index 
and gallons per hour were assigned five percent, below measures related to warfighting 
focus and maintenance excellence, because of the emphasis each interview respondent 
put on warfighting ability. As the strike fighter balanced scorecard matures, there will 
likely be cause to adjust the weights and targets. 
F. SUMMARY 
The research revealed that stakeholders from various parts of Naval aviation view 
successful strike fighter squadrons as those which most closely follow the CNO’s tenets. 
The research also revealed that operational squadrons make no systematic efforts to 
reduce operating costs. The author used data from structured interviews, a review of 
salient balanced scorecard literature, and his experience in the strike fighter community 
to construct a practical balanced scorecard. The strike fighter balanced scorecard will 
assist commanders in reducing operating costs without compromising what is most 
important to ensure success. Specific details of the strike fighter balanced scorecard can 
be seen in the Appendix. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS  
The idea that middle managers within Naval aviation do not expend noticeable 
effort to reduce their costs should be shocking from an enterprise perspective. The NAE 
has created an array of financial analysis tools available to every squadron, yet one can 
argue squadron personnel do not know how their actions affect operating costs. Given 
mounting fiscal pressure, the proper tool could help CNAF to translate his mission, 
producing the right readiness at a reduced cost, down to the lowest levels of each 
squadron. Civilian companies have used the balanced scorecard to do that very thing, but 
the balanced scorecard is not a plug-and-play panacea. Kaplan and Norton (2001) are 
quick to point out that executive level support for the balanced scorecard is essential to its 
success. The admirals’ support alone will not make the balanced scorecard successful. 
The O-6 level leaders must also recognize and support the importance of introducing the 
concept of cost reduction into conversations about the proper management of a strike 
fighter squadron. Support by the admirals and O-6s is a necessary condition for the 
balanced scorecard to have any utility. 
Interview respondents asserted there must be an incentive for squadrons to reduce 
their costs; some kind of reward. Integrating rewards into a work environment and/or the 
balanced scorecard can be complex and invite unintended consequences (Albright, 
Burgess, & Davis, 2011). Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Squadron commanders know that warfighting skill is important to their superiors and 
make great effort to meet expectations. Squadron commanders who do not meet 
expectations for warfighting skill are held accountable through their fitness reports and 
reputations. Following that logic, if squadron commanders know that reducing operating 
costs is important to their superior, they will make an effort to meet expectations. The 
strike fighter balanced scorecard is a method to communicate the importance, 
expectations, and manner in which squadrons can achieve CNAF’s mission. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF A SUCCESSFUL BALANCED SCORECARD 
If the strike fighter balanced scorecard works as intended, the ultimate result 
would be an under-execution of the FA-18 program’s operations and maintenance 
budget. From a comptroller perspective, this might seem unacceptable; in their view, 
efficient budget execution is the proper and complete exhaustion of allotted funds within 
the specified time period. Failure to expend all allotted funds in one period is an 
indication that less may be required in the next period. An organization that does not 
spend its money this year may receive less next year. To some extent this is true but not 
insofar as the concept applies to the management of a strike fighter squadron and its 
relation to the Navy’s flying hour program. Squadron leaders are trained that the flying 
hour program buys readiness through flight hours.  “Hours execution is the primary goal. 
Either you run out of money or you give back money, CNAF will adjust as necessary” 
(Bouyer, 2013, slide 16). This is arguably why squadron leaders make no effort to reduce 
operating costs; they are only held accountable for executing their assigned flight hours. 
If squadrons were to use the strike fighter balanced scorecard to reduce their operating 
costs, then yes, at some level there will be an indication of under-execution. However, if 
under-execution resulting from squadron efficiencies leads to a reduction in the funds 
allotted to the FA-18 program with the same amount of flight hours, then one might argue 
that is mission success. If each flight hour costs less this year than last, perhaps the 
degree to which flight hours are reduced can be lessened even as the Department of 
Defense’s budget authority declines. 
A successful strike fighter balanced scorecard may also reduce variation among 
squadrons in cost per flight hour, tactical performance, and readiness achievement. While 
a reduction in variation of tactical performance will hold the attention of operational 
leaders, the idea that variation in readiness and cost per flight hour will be of concern to 
those involved in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. 
Reducing the variation in cost per flight hour across the fleet could result in a more 
accurate flight hour projection system and better fidelity in the OP-20 funding document. 
Reducing the variation associated with achieving readiness may help better identify the 
relationship between the number of flight hours and the level of readiness that can be 
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achieved. In any case, involving those within each squadron in the process of finding 
efficiencies may alleviate some degree of difficulty in the decisions faced by Naval 
aviation’s leaders. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
The author attempted to design a practical balanced scorecard that is easy for 
squadrons to implement and use. The figures of the balanced scorecard in the appendix 
show data sources for each measure and a recommendation for whom should be 
responsible to collect the data. Each of the measures contains data that personnel in 
successful squadron are likely already tracking, so the process of populating the 
scorecard should not be time consuming. 
The measures and targets within this strike fighter balanced scorecard are neither 
definitive nor have they been tested; they serve as a starting point from which to build. 
Whether in magnitude or scope, some part of this strike fighter balanced scorecard will 
need to be adjusted as learning occurs and the scorecard matures. Kaplan and Norton 
(1996) describe feedback loops and how critical they are in maintaining the effectiveness 
and relevance of the balanced scorecard. To facilitate the feedback and coordination of 
changes to the balanced scorecard, it should be controlled and distributed by an 
appropriate representative within the Naval Aviation Enterprise. Custody of the scorecard 
could be given to the current readiness cross functional team, integrated resource 
management team, or even the type wing. Whoever is named responsible for the 
scorecard should make every effort to solicit, collect, and validate feedback from 
commanding officers. Armed with that feedback, the responsible party must make 
thoughtful changes to the scorecard that truly support the objectives and the mission. 
Without these vital steps, the literature suggests the scorecard will have little chance for 
success. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE STRIKE FIGHTER BALANCED SCORECARD 
The idea that the strike fighter balanced scorecard can assist squadron leaders in 
reducing their cost per flight hour is based upon the assumption that the number of flight 
hours will not change significantly. A large reduction in the number of flight hours may 
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counteract the efforts of even the most ardent conservationist. Some degree of the 
maintenance cost is not variable with respect to flight hours. Some maintenance required 
is based upon how much time has elapsed (e.g., 14 days, 84 days), not how many flight 
hours have been flown. Additionally, if aircraft are not flown for a period of 30 days or 
more, there is the cost of inspections and functional check flights associated with 
bringing the aircraft back into service. Aside from the maintenance aspect, the cost 
associated with bringing the currency and skill of aircrew back to acceptable levels after 
long periods of reduced flying is real and difficult to forecast. For these reasons, even if a 
squadron were to implement the strike fighter balanced scorecard in earnest, it may not 
be able to reduce the cost per flight hour due to loss of economies of scale. 
There are a variety of limitations associated with the strike fighter balanced 
scorecard. The balanced scorecard was constructed from data extracted from only nine 
interviews. While that is not necessarily a negative mark when compared to Kaplan and 
Norton’s description of a balanced scorecard team, it is a negative mark in terms of a 
sufficient sample size to truly determine cause and effect relationships between 
objectives and their drivers and measures.   
The top management of Naval aviation was not directly engaged in the 
development of the strike fighter balanced scorecard. This would defy Kaplan and 
Norton’s (1996) recommendations. They advise that once senior managers have been 
interviewed and the preliminary framework has been developed, the results should be 
reviewed by top management to ensure consensus. The author lacked interaction with the 
top management of Naval aviation during the development of the strike fighter balanced 
scorecard. Because of this, there might be some degree of misalignment among the 
strategy, objectives, and measures. 
The strike fighter balanced scorecard does not include the air wing commander, to 
whom the squadron commanding officer is responsible. If the air wing commander does 
not hold the squadron commander accountable for the squadron’s readiness and its cost, 




squadron commanders in accomplishing what is most important for success. If the air 
wing commander does not see reducing cost as important to success, a cost reduction tool 
of any kind will be of little or no help. 
The strike fighter balanced scorecard leaves much discretion to the squadron 
commanding officer to set performance targets. If commanding officers do not appreciate 
the utility of the strike fighter balanced scorecard, they may not select challenging targets 
or robust plans against which they can measure their progress. In such cases, the 
scorecard measures may indicate success but the actual outcomes may not. 
These weaknesses can only be shored up through support from senior Naval 
aviation leadership in both the operational and administrative chains of command. 
Without pressure from above, the feedback loop so essential to the maturation of the 
balanced scorecard will not be maintained and the balanced scorecard will almost 
certainly be doomed to failure. 
E. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
The research in this study identified a weakness in the Naval Aviation Enterprise 
and proposed a practical means of balancing cost reduction and combat effectiveness at 
the squadron level. Balanced scorecard practitioners can benefit from the adjustments 
made to the perspectives to fit a military combat unit. Most notably, the internal 
processes perspective holds training related objectives while the personnel perspective 
holds health, career, and morale objectives. This adjustment reflects a different way of 
adapting the balanced scorecard than found in the literature reviewed. The measures 
throughout the strike fighter balanced scorecard can be of benefit to both Naval aviation 
stakeholders and balanced scorecard practitioners. Many of the measures employed in the 
strike fighter balanced scorecard are adaptations of currently used measures that have the 
potential to represent the effects of squadron actions in a more timely and clear manner. 
Ideally, the successful implementation of the strike fighter balanced scorecard will make 
Naval aviation stakeholders and balanced scorecard practitioners members of one group 
instead of two. 
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F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the analysis that went into the development of the strike fighter balanced 
scorecard, some of the measures may not have causal impacts on the objectives. The links 
between this scorecard’s measures, or other measures widely used by the Navy, and the 
objectives within each perspective should be researched to understand the true nature of 
their relationships. 
Five of the stakeholders expressed frustration with manning levels during the 
interviews. The problems were not just with the number of personnel, but also with the 
level of training and experience some Sailors have when reporting to their units. For 
example, an E-6 reporting to a strike fighter squadron is expected to have a certain level 
of expertise (QPT, NEC) and experience with FA-18s. An E-6 might report to a strike 
fighter squadron having the correct NEC and QPT level, but his experience was gained 
with a different aircraft type (e.g., helicopters). This individual is then placed in the 
position of supervising a work center but not being qualified to work on the aircraft 
himself. It is not hard to see how conflicts and difficulties might arise from such 
situations. Research should be conducted to investigate the correlation of under-manning 
in critical billets with maintenance costs. How much does it cost us to not properly man a 
squadron? 
Three of the interview respondents discussed aviation depot level repairs at some 
length. Each of them expressed uncertainty about the relationship of squadron actions and 
aviation depot level repairs costs. Aviation depot level repair trends may be difficult to 
trace to squadron actions because the depot level repair facilities are funded through the 
Navy Working Capital Fund. The depots must adjust their service levels or prices (parts 
and service) each year to correct for losses or gains in the previous year. Their goal is to 
only recover their costs and achieve a net operating result of zero each year (Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011). This can cause relatively erratic fluctuations in service levels 
and prices. Variation in prices might make it difficult to ascertain the effect of squadron 
actions on their aviation depot level repairables costs over long periods of time. Variation 
of service levels may also be negatively affecting the fleet. Unanticipated fluctuations in 
demand for depot parts and services may also contribute to price fluctuations in later 
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periods as the depot adjusts pricing to achieve a zero net operating result (Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011). Funding the depot level repair facilities through the Navy 
Working Capital Fund provides cost visibility within their facilities (DoD, 2013), but it 
may obscure cost visibility to their customers. The question one must ask is where is the 
priority?  Is it on fleet requirements, or the depot’s Navy Working Capital Fund corpus? 
Research should be conducted to investigate the possibility of changing depot level fleet 
readiness centers to mission funding. The congressional budget office conducted a study 
comparing Navy working capital funding to mission funding in Naval shipyards; 
something similar should be done for aviation. 
Stakeholders in the strike fighter community have argued over the fuel/drag 
benefits of removing external fuel tanks and weapon pylons versus the work required to 
install and remove them. Research should be conducted to investigate costs and benefits 
of various configurations in various environments. Would it save the fleet money to 
operate super hornets with no centerline external fuel tank while shore based at Naval Air 
Station Lemoore?   Individuals argue that pilot technique, detailed mission planning, and 
efficient training scenario management coupled with less drag would make up for the 
reduced fuel load. Others argue that one must use the configuration that is the expected 
for combat. Who is right and what is the priority?  If the author had to choose between 
fewer flight hours and reduced realism due to configuration in training, he would choose 
reduced realism. What is the opportunity cost of not choosing the optimum configuration 
when one considers fuel cost and maintenance man-hours? 
Current readiness instructions view all aircrew the same regardless of their 
experience or capability. All aircrew must accomplish the same number of tasks to be 
“skilled” in a given NTA. For example, the current readiness instructions do not allow for 
the argument that a senior pilot might need less practice at basic fighter maneuvering than 
a junior pilot to become skilled in the offensive counter air and defensive counter air 
NTAs. That level of precision is not present in our current readiness measuring systems. 
Research should be conducted to determine a practical method for measuring readiness 
based upon differing experience levels and/or competence levels. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
Twelve years of conflict have created a laser-like focus on effectiveness with little 
regard for costs in strike fighter squadrons. As Naval aviation leaders struggle with 
solving difficult problems, assistance from all hands down to the lowest ranking Sailor is 
required. Old budget execution ideas of “use it or lose it” must be addressed at the 
appropriate levels and cost reduction within squadrons must have support and clear 
expectations from the O-6 level. The strike fighter balanced scorecard is the first step of 
bringing cost-wise readiness to the deckplates of a strike fighter squadron. It is the 
“balance” of the balanced scorecard that brings value to Naval aviation. With this tool, 
leaders can ask squadrons to reduce cost without fear of losing their focus on warfighting, 
operating forward, or being ready. Properly supported and maintained, the strike fighter 
balanced scorecard can overcome a weakness in the Naval Aviation Enterprise and make 
readiness at a reduced cost a reality. 
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APPENDIX 
The strike fighter balanced scorecard is intended to be a tool for commanding 
officers to use on a monthly basis to aid them in achieving the required readiness at a 
reduced cost. The author constructed the scorecard in such a way that collecting and 
managing the data would not be too burdensome on squadron personnel. The overview 
sheet includes a column for the party responsible for collecting data and another column 
indicating the data source. The input sheets are organized by perspective/department. The 
author recommends that only the commanding officer and department heads have the 
ability to modify the scorecard. Each department head could then gather the data from 
their subordinates and enter it into the scorecard. The following pages display Excel 
screenshots of a sample strike fighter balanced scorecard. 
Training Officers and Landing Signal Officers could be made responsible for 
collecting the data required for the operational perspective’s measures. Successful 
squadrons already collect much of the data, so little additional work load would be 
needed in most cases. Squadrons would need to record data for the training readiness, air-
to-air effectiveness, and air-to-surface effectiveness measures after each flight. The 
Squadron Duty Officer, who manages the daily flight schedule, could be assigned 
responsibility for collecting data-collection forms from the flight-lead after each flight. 
Strike fighter weapons school personnel collect similar data during the strike fighter 
advanced readiness program (formal unit-level training exercise), so collecting such data 
after each flight would not seem foreign to most aircrew. Landing Signal Officers have 
access to the air wing database which tracks landing performance; they usually post this 
data in the ready room aboard ship on a daily basis. Although not in the operations 
department, the squadron Material Control Officer would provide the data for the gallons 
per hour measure because he/she has access to the computer system which tracks fuel 
charges. 
The Quality Assurance Officer, Assistant Maintenance Officer, and Maintenance 
Material Control Officer are best suited to collect data required by the internal processes 
perspective. The Quality Assurance officer should already be tracking the timeliness of 
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QA audits; however, tracking the measures for work center discrepancies, and drills 
would likely be a new concept. The Assistant Maintenance Officer is responsible for 
manning and training within the maintenance department and likely already closely 
tracks QPT, NEC, and maintenance personnel readiness. Because of their training and 
experience, The Material Control Officer or the Maintenance Material Control Officer 
could be responsible for managing and measuring training events associated with 
AIRSpeed, continuous process improvement, or the “boots on ground/deck” programs. 
The Command Master Chief, Educational Services Officer, and Health Promotion 
Program Officer should be the only ones necessary to gather data required for the 
personnel perspective. The Command Master Chief is the senior enlisted person in a 
squadron and is in the best position to collect the survey data for the positive environment 
measure. The Command Master Chief is also responsible for oversight of the career 
development boards and would easily be able to track how many are behind schedule. 
The Educational Services Officer and Health Promotion Program Officers are responsible 
for the advancement exam preparation and health promotion programs respectively. They 
should have data necessary for their associated measures readily at hand. 
The Assistant Operations Officer and Material Control Officer would have easy 
access to the data required for measures in the commander’s perspective. Based upon 
their squadron duties, both should know how to quickly calculate the measures. 
This intent of this section is not to prescribe the specific manner in which 
squadrons implement the strike fighter balanced scorecard, rather it is to illustrate that 
integration of the strike fighter balanced scorecard into the daily activities of squadron 
personnel should not cause noticeable displacement of other important duties. The strike 
fighter balanced scorecard requires no additional software, no additional instructions or 
directives, and no additional training. The strike fighter balanced scorecard does not hope 
to standardized squadrons’ actions; it hopes to standardize squadrons’ focus and 
priorities. The strike fighter balanced scorecard is a tool squadrons can employ to 
introduce cost reduction into the conversations of how to best manage a strike fighter 
squadron; doing so can bring cost-wise readiness to the squadron level of Naval aviation. 
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Figure 21.  Strike Fighter Balanced Scorecard Overview 
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Figure 22.  Commander’s Input Sheet 
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Figure 23.  Operational Perspective Input Sheet 
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Figure 24.  Internal Processes Perspective Input Sheet 
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Figure 25.  Personnel Perspective Input Sheet 
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Figure 26.  Strike Fighter Balanced Scorecard Dashboard 
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